

## **Influence of Religion on International Relations of South Asia Examining the Case of India and Pakistan with Special Reference to Hindu and Muslim Identity**

**Noor ul Huda\*<sup>1</sup>**

<sup>1</sup>\*Lecturer, Department of International Relations, Fatima Jinnah Women University,  
Rawalpindi, Punjab, Pakistan.

**Corresponding author:** [noorulhuda@fjwu.edu.pk](mailto:noorulhuda@fjwu.edu.pk)

**Keywords:** South Asia, India, Pakistan, Religious Parties, Religious Organizations, Non-State Actors', International Relations

**DOI No:**

<https://doi.org/10.56976/jsom.v4i1.240>

*India and Pakistan are two essential significant regional players of South East Asia, both vary greatly in terms of geographic size, location, religious, political and social customs, economic and political system, type of government, and interaction with major powers. The south Asian states have had varying political backgrounds since their emergence from English rule in the late Forties, with the regular democratic interludes in Pakistan, with increasing impact for Islamist political parties and movements; and a long-established, secular democracy in India, significantly affected recently by Hindu nationalism. The Kashmir issue is the bone of contention between Pakistan and India which could be an atomic flash point between two traditional spiritual and religious enemies of the region. This paper focus the religious influence on the policies of India and Pakistan toward each other. This is because in both states several religious leaders are essential politically both locally and with regards to state foreign policies and worldwide relations. For each of these two states of Asian region, it determine that: local political system and procedure have tossed up politically significant political leaders which often seek to effect global outcomes, and religious goals do not take priority over state security issues in these South East Asian states' foreign policy. This article is descriptive in its framework and looks for to increase the analytical framework on the topic.*

## 1. Introduction

In 1947 Pakistan and India obtained independence under the support of the Muslim League and Congress Party respectively. Politically prominent for three years, the Congress party later experienced serious electoral decrease. From the mid-1970s, its hegemony was weakened by the emergence of various identity and religious based political parties. During the 1980's and 90's, the number of parties improved from a few to around 450. Most of the new political parties centered their electoral slogans on various cultural and identity aspects, especially caste, ethnic background and religious beliefs. During now, public stress between, on one side, Sikhs and Hindus, and on the other, Hindus and Muslims, distribute from the city in to the non-urban areas where they were previously mostly unidentified (Bhatt, 2001; Shome, 2023).

They became noticeable in various the southern part of state, such as Tamil Nadu, as well as in its northern border, such as Punjab and Jammu-Kashmir. The issue between Sikhs and Hindus came to a head in the 1980's, based in the Sikh demand for their own condition in Punjab (putatively to be called 'Khalistan'), recognized by various enemy functions perpetuated by militant Sikhs, such as the killing of the then congress prime minister, Indira Gandhi, 33 years ago (Kalaiyarasan & Vijayabaskar, 2021). There followed extensive devastation of Sikh-owned property and the killings of Sikhs in several northern India states, perpetrated by Hindu gangs (Lasa, 2024). Gradually, however, due to a mixture of strong-arm techniques on the part of situations and the political division of the Sikhs into various groups, Sikh requirements for Khalistan demolished. From the 90's, however, conflict designed between India's Islamic communities some 11 % of the inhabitants, around 130 thousand people and various Hindu nationalist motions (Shome, 2023).

On the other side, the religious-political parties in Pakistan have been attempting to accomplish their plans since the state obtained freedom (Hussain, 2024). Their primary focus has been on Islamization of country and religious-socialization of community. They created early benefits on the Islamization front side, by handling to determine the ideological discussion of situations through the objective resolution of 1949 (Hussain, 2024). These religious political parties also had their say in the form of a proper constitutional recommendation that "divine" rules will have priority over rules created by parliament and also got Shariah rules implemented during the government of Gen Zia ul Haq (Ali, 1999; Iqbal et al., 2023). Despite this important success, the religious political parties are still having difficulties for overall Islamization of country. Simultaneously, they have been advertising a discussion of religious socializing, which dovetails with their political objectives. On that front side also, their success is important since the trend of religious-socialization are becoming improving noticeable in community (Kainat & Buzdar, 2023). The supreme purpose of both the religious discourses is to implement Islam in every area of life by mixing the following six variables: political Islamization, replenish list movements, Sufism, Tableegh and Da'awa (preaching and call to Islam), sectarianism and militarization (Kainat & Buzdar, 2023). These aspects often overlap and can be found in most major religious political organization or movements in the state (Wang et al., 2024). The complexness of these discourses' spawns' several arguments among the organization, depending on how each group

interprets its role and describes their sphere (Whetsell et al., 2025). It also brings about variations leading to division within each group's positions. In 2002, as many as 239 spiritual companies were working in Pakistan, seeking mostly similar plans (Wang et al., 2024). Many of them may appear to be separated along sectarian lines; but are not averse to working together wherever there is a confluence of interest (Cohen, 2004; Li et al., 2021).

## **2. Literature Review and Results**

### **2.1 Politics and religion in India**

Under the rule of Congress Party India experienced stable democratic political system from their independence in 1947. However, India experienced improving political conflicts from the 1970, recognized by a general loss of democratic stability and fragmentation of the previously constant party system. Presently, several new political parties appeared. Many desired to represent constituencies that until then were politically marginalized, such as numerous religious (especially Hindu and Muslim), Caste, cultural, and domestic interest. The growth to political popularity of what is also known as Hindu nationalism schedules from now. The electoral success of the Hindu nationalist Bhartiya Janata party (BJP) started in the early 1980's, starting a process that saw the BJP become the most electorally significant party in India from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s. During now India had following coalition rule led by the BJP. The increased domestic political influence effect of the Bhartiya Janata party was built on a Hindu religious belief known as Hindutva ('Hindu nationalism') (Bhatt, 2001).

The concerns of Hindutva were shown in both a noticeable 'Islamophobia' and a move away from worldwide non-alignment towards close interaction with United States of America and Israel. The effect of Hindutva was also shown associated to two specific foreign policies problems: the ongoing argument with mainly Pakistan over the Kashmir and the now-ended civil war in Sri Lanka between Hindu Tamils and Buddhist Sinhalese. In short, Hindutva affected Indian foreign policy under BJP government, although this was not only aspect of importance. According to the Ganguly 'the end of the Cold War and of the USSR experiment destroyed the long-cherished presumptions of Indian foreign policy authorities and pressured an extreme renegotiation of its foreign policy' (Ganguly, 2003). Showing this, the delayed Narasimha Rao, the Indian Prime Minister from Congress Party between 1991 and 1996, was the primary supporter of India's post-Cold War 'New Look' foreign policy. This appeared as a result of two contemporaneous worldwide developments which together considerably affected Indian foreign policy and worldwide relations:

- Transformed international atmosphere after the Cold War;
- Collapse of India's key friends USSR, with following effect on India's views of the worldwide power balance.

Between 1996 and 2004 the Bhartiya Janata party was in government. Its period coincided with a phase of worldwide relations which recognized by the increase of 'USA unilateralism and new American foreign policy of pre-emption and army involvement in international matters without restraint'. In addition, the disintegration of USSR and the generally changed worldwide atmosphere as a result of globalization led to a reorientation of Indian foreign policy. There were,

however, competitive influence. On the one hand, there was Hindutva, a powerful domestic political aspect, and, on the other, there was the effect of globalization and the effectiveness of the United States of America. Government of India from now recognized the desirability of developing new alliances and foreign policy guidelines or direction. As a result, during the Bhartiya Janata party government in 1996, there was not an unexpected move in foreign policy direction, rather there was a continual, at the same time with a lot different ideological component: from foreign non-alignment to Hindutva. This was shown in the Bhartiya Janata party foreign policy focus which was concerned with 'United States and India ideal collaboration, decreasing and increasing the size of collaboration with both Israel and China' and a dedication 'to bring the "old enemy", Pakistan, toward the peaceful conversation' (Kapila, 2005).

### **Hindutva and foreign policy**

To what level, if at all, is the belief of Hindutva estimated into India's foreign policy and global relations, especially during Bhartiya Janata party government? According to Katalya, following freedom in 1947, India's foreign policy was described as both control and pragmatism, including:

- Dialogue with Pakistan;
- Expansion of business and financial commitment interaction with China;
- Strengthening the connections with Western European, Russia, Japan and America;
- Efforts to help the build an international regional organization, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (Katalya, 2004).

### **India's foreign policy changes**

Ganguly claims that there was a change in concentrate in India's foreign policy from the 90's. This was not so much to do with the effect of Hindutva as the modified worldwide conditions of now such as the end of the Cold War and the effect of globalization which, was most important in describing the shift in concentrate in Indian foreign policy. Until now, the primary concentrate was on non-alignment between the two superpowers, former Soviet Union and the United States of America, indicating even-handed working with the government authorities of both states. India also desired to venture itself as a defensive player of the world's inadequate and incapable.

Looking for the latter purpose, political leadership of India required a 'global foreign aid program designed to redistribute the world's prosperity, a worldwide trading order that preferred the needs of the south Asian states, and the orientating of such international economic organizations as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank so as to give the sluggish and economically weak country a greater status. These efforts created little of substance' (Ganguly, 2003/4:42).

The end of the Cold War and the deepening of globalization coincided with the increase to power the Bhartiya Janata party and more strident declaration of the belief of Hindutva. (MA Farquhar, 2003) declares that under the Bhartiya Janata party, Indian foreign policy moved concentrate from an anxiety about non-alignment and growth injustices to a noticeable concern about 'Islamist terrorism'. This intended a more rough position towards Pakistan, which the India government stated was the primary attract of 'anti-Indian', Muslim terrorist group battling to wrest

Muslim-majority Kashmir from Indian control. More generally, the Bhartiya Janata party government 'criticized non-alignment and endorsed a more strenuous use of Indian power to protect state interest from break down at the hands of China and Pakistan. The Bhartiya Janata party also preferred the obvious getting atomic weapons'.

Overall, Thirumalai statements that, following the Bhartiya Janata party climb to government in the mid-1990s, 'the part of faith in India's foreign policy cannot be overstated. Hindus state they are the most resistant of all religious groups. But this country has been consistently destroyed, causing in certain side effects among numerous countries.' Consequently, India has come to deal with the truth that Hinduism is more or less a sole state religion, whereas Islam, Christianity and Buddhism are faiths used and motivated in many and numerous states. The opinion on the practitioners of other religion hold regarding Hinduism and Hindus certainly impacts the foreign policy of these states towards India. India's insistence on its secular qualifications may be valued in the educational sectors around the globe, but India carries on to be a Hindu-majority country, a Hindu country, in the thoughts of lay Christian believers, Muslims, and Buddhists around the globe. The foreign policy remedies of other nations do not succeed to identify that India is a Hindu country, despite India's declares on the opposite (Thirumalai, 2001).

According to Marshall, views of India as a Hindu country were strengthened due to many occurrences of Hindu extremism and terrorism. Worldwide since 9/11, much interest has been compensated to Islamic extremism and terrorism but relatively little interest to what some experts see as progressively violence trends towards Hindu extremism among groups suggesting Hindutva, such as the RSS and VHP (United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, 2004) Such extremism, was sustained by 'allies in the Indian government, which until mid-2004 was led by the Bhartiya Janata Party' (Marshall, 2004).

Bidwai indicates that 'if the ideologues of India's Hindu-supremacist BJP and law makers in the coalition rule it brings in New Delhi had their way, they would bring into being just such a partnership or "Axis of Virtue" against "global terrorism", relating to the Indian government, Israel and United States of America (Bidwai, 2003). India's then state security advisor, Brajesh Mishra, innovative the 'Axis of Virtue' offer on 8 May 2003, in California. Mishra was working with the American Jewish Committee (AJC) at a meeting where there were also many US Congressmen and women present. Mishra highlighted his desire to help fashion an 'alliance of free cultures associated with combating' the scourge of terrorism. Apart from the truth that the United States of America, India and Israel were all 'advanced democracies', each 'had been an important target on terrorism. They have to mutually bear the unpleasant experience of modern-day terrorism'. The suggested 'Axis of Virtue' would aim to 'take on worldwide terrorism in a natural and targeted way to make sure the international method followed to its sensible conclusion, and does not run out of vapor because of other preoccupations. It owes this persistence for their upcoming generations' (Mishra, 2003).

A month later, also in California, Deputy Prime Minister Lal Krishna Advani talked in radiant conditions about the offer. He pressured 'similarities' between India and the United States of America, giving them a call 'natural democracies'. He recognized the relationship 'developing



between our two nations, which is strongly reflected' in President Bush's newest National Security strategy. Obliquely mentioning to Pakistan, he included, 'it is not a partnership of comfort. It is a principled relationship' (Bidwai, 2003).

According to Bidwai, 'The Bhartiya Janata Party belief admires people like [the then Israeli prime minister, Ariel] Sharon for their machismo and intense jingoism. It recognizes Hindus and Judaism people (plus Christians) as "strategic allies" against Islam and Confucianism. Outrageous and illegal as it is, this "clash-of-civilizations" idea has many takers on India's Hindu Right.' Overall, according to Bidwai, there were three the reason why the BJP desired to move India nearer to Israel and its belief of Zionism:

- Awish to build nearer relationship with Israel's primary friend, the USA, and thus try to separate Pakistan,
- Shared 'Islamophobia' and anti-Arabism,
- Shared persistence for a competitive and powerful.

## **2.2 Politics and religion in Pakistan**

Pakistan's political structure is significant for personalist, rather than institutional, carrying of power, assisted by three improvements. First, Pakistan's federal government was designed to supply provincial legislatures and government authorities to check the power of country at the nationwide level. However, these important checks and balance soon became filled with cronies of numbers at the center and, as a result, the ability to check the power of the national government, reduced. Second, regional, cultural and religious division helped to make Pakistan's state policies both unpredictable and aggressive. Third, when the Muslim League Party come into government after partition it was at the cost of walking away from its governmental hinterland in North India, a development that provided, more usually, to curse the growth of a competitive party system. Instead, political leadership, both civil and army presided over a political system based in populism, with power intensely customized and frequently misused (Diamond, 1999).

Pakistan did not develop a practical political party system. Under army rule in the late nineteen fifties, all political parties were prohibited, and even during the periods they were able to function, situations desired closely to manage them. Following a brief period of relative independence of operation in the nineteen seventies and first half of 1980's, the then army master, General Zia, prohibited political parties again, declaring that the very concept of pluralistic parties was 'non-Islamic'. When they are able to operate, political parties in Pakistan are basically sectional that is, based on cultural, religious, or local concerns. They are typically ineffectual at mobilizing people and vulnerable to enter and quickly leave unpredictable multiparty alignments.

Like Indian, the political situation in India's next door neighbor, Pakistan, was also described as both motions and the noticeable impact of spiritual companies in this case, various Islamist organization. In the 1980's and 90's, short-lived, democratically elected civil government authorities followed each other rapidly. Then, in October 1999, the army walked in and ended the democratic system. This was, however, a usually popular move that shown an extensive view in Pakistan: when citizens are in power they tend to concept both badly and corruptly. Many Pakistanis, embarrassed at the lack of subsequent elected government authorities to manage the

scale of crime, were said at now to be ‘disillusioned, unsociable, tired unsociable to the destiny of the venal political numbers so busy coating their own pouches that they had short amount of a chance to consider the well-being of the country and its people’ (Ali, 1999).

Despite the unconstitutional nature of the army takeover, some popular people freely called for a political structure that would give the military a long lasting, institutionalized, ‘supervisory’ governmental role. The continual governmental popularity of the army in Pakistan eventually gave way to anelected political government in 2008. The rule of the army was supported by the support of significant religious political parties and movements that, like their alternatives in India, the Hindu nationalists, desired to impact Pakistan’s foreign policy and international relations. This was especially obvious with regards to the questioned Kashmir region, a bone of contention between India and Pakistan since the creation of Pakistan in 1947.

### **3. Islamism and foreign policy**

Although Pakistan appeared as an independent country for India’s Muslims, this did not mean that there was only one idea of the concept of an Islamic state; actually, there were at least two. On one side, the secularized political leadership regarded Islam a community, governmental and national identification that could be removed of its religious content. On the contrary, a significant section of individuals, led by Muslim leadership, predicted and later, when it was not forth-coming, required a state whose structure, organizations and workouts of everyday life would be controlled by Islamic law and standards. The significance of the battle over both the governmental role of Islam and the cultural and local rivalries between west and East Pakistan can be measured by the truth that no structure could be developed until 1956, a several years after the emergence of the country. The structure announced Pakistan to be ‘an Islamic state’, and made all parliamentary lawmaking topic to evaluation by an Islamic Research Institution.

Following a positive army takeover in 1958, the constitution and political structure was eliminated and the Republic of Pakistan was announced. The primary aim of the army rule was try to control the power of religious leadership and their organization. Over the following years, however, the problem of the characteristics of a state in Pakistan was not settled. Many military rulers, such as Zia ul-Haq (1977–88), desired to Islamize a state further. Civil secular political leadership, such as Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1972–77) tried to lessen religious political impact. Later, trying to improve assistance from the traditional Islamic organization, Nawaz Sharif rule (1988–93) obtained passing of an Islamic law bill in 1991. While for many Muslims the law did not go far enough in looking for to Islamize the state, many secular-minded Pakistanis terrifying that a theocracy was being recognized (Cohen, 2004; Malik, 2002).

In foreign policy conditions, the governmental significance of Islam in Pakistan is shown in the emergence of a number of significant Islamist organization whose primary concentrate is the India of Kashmir, the only one in Indian with a Muslim greater part inhabitants. While religious group have persisted in Pakistan since freedom, their figures increased during Zia government (1977–88). Zia motivated the development of religious organization, which he saw as a useful governmental tool in support for his government; this insurance plan led to both development in numbers and development of political significance of various Islamist organizations. Three

primary religious groups clearly search for Kashmir's 'liberation' from India: and Harakat ul-Mujahidin, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). Lashkar-e-Taiba is the equipped side of Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-Irshad, a pro-Sunni, anti-American Islamist team recognized in 1989. LeT battles Indian in the disputed area of Kashmir. In the past few years, several LeT agents were found guilty of enemy expenses by the government of America. In November 2008, LeT was accountable for the blockade of the Taj Resort in Mumbai, which led to the fatalities of more than 170 people (Tankel, 2009).

Another militant group, Jaish-e-Mohammed ('The Military of Mohammed') was recognized in 1994. It is a terrorist religious group centered in Pakistan but mostly financed from the Britian, especially Manchester and Birmingham. Like LeT, JeM provides out equipped strikes on India army and citizens in the India region of Jammu and Kashmir. Both JeM and LeT are said to canvass 'for followers at England colleges and universities', and have done so for many years. 'Although both are banned in England they still gather around £5 million a year from United Kingdom contributors, most of whom believe they are providing to relief causes in Kashmir when some of that money is redirected to terrorist cell.' Ahmed Omar Sheikh, a former English public schoolboy, was one of their more well-known employees. He discontinued his degree course at the London school of economics in 1992' (McCarthy, 2002) and at the time of composing (mid-2012) is on loss of life row in Islamabad supposedly for masterminding the kidnap and killing of Daniel Gem, a Walls street Publication news reporter.

The third militant group, Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM, 'Movement of Sacred Warriors'), is a religious militant group centered in Pakistan but working mainly in Indian-controlled Kashmir, where it performs rebel and enemy actions. In mid-February 2000, the deputy leadership of the HUM group Farooq Kashmiri, a well-known Kashmiri political leader, changed the organization's head, Fazlur Rehman Khalil. The militant group has a name in several Pakistani places, such as Rawalpindi and Muzaffarabad, as well as in Afghanistan. It is regarded that HUM has a few million, mostly equipped followers, located mainly in Azad Kashmir (part of the former princely region of Jammu and Kashmir now handled by Pakistan), Pakistan, and the Kashmir and Doda areas of Indian. Due to defections to Jaish-e-Mohammed, HUM missing some of its account, although it is said still to be able of undertaking functions in Kashmir against both India soldiers and civilian. HUM has also been connected to a local Kashmiri religious militant group, al-Faran, which in 1995 kidnapped and killed five European visitors in Kashmir. Moreover, in Dec 2000, HUM was engaged in hijacking an Indian airliner. Numerous of its militant followers handled to acquire contract for the launch of Masood Azhar. Azhar had been locked up by the government of Indian in 1994, for militant activities; he had led the HUM's precursor, the Harakat ul-Ansar. On his release from the prisoner, Azhar select to create a new militant group the Jaish-e-Mohammed rather than go back to the HUM (Katzman, 2002).

#### **4. Similarities in worldview between Hindutva organizations in India and Islamist entities in Pakistan**

There are resemblances in the geostrategic worldview of Pakistan's religious groups described above and those of some of India's Hindutva organization, such as the RSS and VHP.



Each is focused on three the actual places of concern: the domestic, the regional and the worldwide. The supporters of Hindutva see the entire globe in bifurcated conditions that is world basically separated between themselves and others, that is, and non-Hindus while Pakistan's religious Islamic see the entire globe as polarized between Muslims and non-Muslims. Supporters of Hindutva recognize a key enemy: Pakistan, said to be the primary promoter of militant Islam not only in Indian usually but also in Kashmir in particular. For Pakistan's Islamists, the government authorities of Indian and the America are the primary opponents, followed by those of Israel and Russia: all are considered naturally 'anti-Muslim' (Cady & Simon, 2007).

The America and India are the primary opponents for the following purpose. The central government of the America is assumed to have a specific and competitive anti-Muslim technique, demonstrated in corrective activities in Afghanistan and Iraq since 9/11, where co-religionists – that is, Sunnis have been on the getting end of United State army activities. Indian, however, especially under Bhartiya Janata Party government, is considered as being usually 'anti-Muslim', but especially excoriated for it's not wanting to acknowledge control over Kashmir to the Islamic majority inhabitants, for factors associated with its belief of Hindutva (Chiriyankanadath, 2006).

Finally, within Pakistan, the government of America was intensely belittled by Islamist organizations for being willing to friend itself with the 'corrupt' structure of Musharraf, which was standing down in 2008 in order, it is stated, to try to manage the state. As an outcome, Pakistan's Islamist militants believe that every 'good Muslim' should enroll in a sacred war against both the America and its regional companions in Pakistan. The religious group want an Islamic country, looking to the form of government recognized by the Taliban government in the neighbor Afghanistan state during their tenure of rule (1996–2001). Overall, religious group of Pakistan's want for Pakistan's foreign relations recognized by the following:

- Abandonment of Pakistan's relation to the America and alternative by an approach of improving hyperlinks with Islamic states to experience 'strategic depth';
- A deepening of confrontational relation with Indian in order to make a quality of the Kashmir issue
- The use of Kashmiri Islamist militants to try to weaken Indian stance to support on to Kashmir, as it is approved that Pakistan's army ability cannot coordinate that of India's (Tankel, 2009).

In the delayed 1970's and the 1980's, Zia's rule motivated the formation and growth of some of Pakistan's religious organization, such as, Sipah-e-Sahaba and the Shia Tehrik-e-Jafria. The US council on foreign relation stated in 2003 that the religious group had 'achieved significant autonomy'. Indeed, since 9/11 and these worldwide 'War on Terror', subsequent government authorities in Pakistan have continuously guaranteed to break down on Pakistan's local Islamist group if they assistance the use of fear to accomplish their goals although it is not obvious that much improvement has been created (Harrison, 2001).

Following the war in Afghanistan (2001) and the US-led intrusion and following profession of Iraq in Goal 2003, Pakistan's militant group became progressively vociferous both in their anti-America and anti-government claims. Recently, Pakistan's militant group have desired to build

linkages and systems with the exact same group in other country, and to operate towards a suggested Islamic claim that expands beyond the territorial boundaries of the existing Pakistan states (Yahuda, 2011).

#### **4.1 Religion and the India Pakistan dispute over Kashmir**

It is the key problem for both Pakistan's religious militant group and supporters of Hindutva in India. At the heart of the current problem between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan is spiritual militancy. If South East Asia is an atomic powdered keg, spiritual militancy is the coordinate that intends to set it off. As is well-known, militant Islamic groups that Pakistan has long reinforced and is only now beginning to limit assaulted India's Parliament in December 2001 and assaulted a Religious cathedral in Islamabad, Pakistan's investment, in March 2002. Then in May 2002 Islamic militants killed more than 30 Indians, most of them women and children, in the occupied region of Kashmir, stressful a restoration of serious stress between these two atomic abilities and longtime competitors.

Conflict over Kashmir has engaged the government authorities of India and Pakistan for more than six years. During Britain government, Kashmir was an anomaly: a Muslim-majority state decided by a Hindu royal prince. The source of the argument is that at the duration of English drawback in 1947, the leaving colonialists did not keep a perfect prescribed for how to split the approximately 500 princely states of English India such as Kashmir between India and Pakistan. In many cases, there was no problem as such states were usually actually situated clearly within the boundaries of post-colonial India or Pakistan. But the Kashmir area, part of the state of Jammu-Kashmir, was a particularly intractable problem between the two states. This was because Muslims were a clear greater part in the Kashmir area, although governed by a Hindu royal prince. Following the formula of division Indian subcontinent in 1947, hostilities split out between the two ends over the problem who would concept in Kashmir, major to the participation of the United Nation in so far failed initiatives to appear at a quality of the 'Kashmir question' (Brass, 2005).

Now, 65 years on, the UN position is still that the political position of Kashmir should be resolved by a referendum among its people. Yet, the elect has never been organized, due to prevarication by the government of India, which worries that it would reduce the elect and thus lose Kashmir to Pakistan. Conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir has not, however, been ongoing. During 4 years ago and beginning 1980's there was an interval of comparative relaxed and balance. It was, however, during now that Pakistan's government under the presidency of Zia-ul-Haq came to power in a takeoverd'état. Zia was important in assisting to make the Islamist militant group mentioned above. Eventually, however, they obtained a high level of freedom. Contemporaneously, in India, the legislature government authorities of Indira Gandhi and her son, Rajiv, started to move the nation away from high-end nationalism towards Hindu nationalism, a plan later followed by the BJP routines of the 90's and beginning 2000s (Haggerty, 2002). The effect on the Kashmir query was not only to improve the problem generally but also to make religious beliefs rather than nationalism which is the key problem on the line in the position of Kashmir (Smock, 2006).

In 1989 there was the regional rebel in Kashmir led by regional Muslims instructed against both the Indian government and the Hindu leadership of the state, which drawn both governmental and content assistance from Pakistan. Ever since then, there has been an lack of ability to take care of the Kashmir problem, changing between times of comparative relaxed and breakouts of problem. Haggerty notices that from the delayed 90's the Kashmir problem became complex by the fact that both India and Pakistan were atomic weapon possessors, a situation that led to 'a greatly improved level of worldwide interest and involvement' (Haggerty, 2002). This was also a duration of accelerating political salience in India of Hindutva and in Pakistan of Islamism.

#### **4.2 Hindutva and the Kashmir conflict**

The increase of Hindutva in India effect the country's problem with Pakistan over Kashmir in two primary methods. First, Hindutva became an important problem with regards to India's local issues, especially during BJP government. Second, Hindutva was an important aspect with regards to India's foreign policy in two primary ways: (1) the link with Pakistan, and (2) more generally with regards to Islamic nations and worries of Islamic extremism. While Ram-Prasad notices that in Indian recently 'religious belief in itself has performed almost no immediate part in significant economic and governmental decisions' (Ram-Prasad, 2000: 153), it seems clear that as a soft power aspect especially with regards to Kashmir Hindutva has been important, together with conventional secular nationalist issues (Chiriyankandath, 2006; Ram-Prasad, 2000).

However, that this indicates salience of Hindutva a soft power especially when it is connected to hard power. Ram-Prasad (2000: 188) statements that 'there is very little even in a "hard" Hindu nationalism which could convert into abelief of expansion'. Yet as it have seen, when Hindutva concepts are connected to hard power, it increases India's take care of not to allow Kashmiri Muslims in organization with the central Pakistani government to control the state, considered by many Indians as the 'jewel in the crown' of 'Hindu India'. This underlines what have continuously mentioned in this written text with regards to various other nations, such as the United State of America, Iran and Israel: a state foreign policy does not take place in solitude from a mixture of domestic influence such as 'geo-strategic place, economic condition, army durability and local stability' (Kapila, 2005), and, might add, in some instances the soft power and religious beliefs.

#### **5. Conclusion**

The impact of religious belief in the global relations of South Asia, with particular concentrate on India and Pakistan, these points are explained below:

- In each of nation, various political problems have long been associated with religious factors;
- This was often in the perspective of competitors or disputes over identification, area or other resources;
- In each case, recognizable spiritual constituencies such as, Hindu fundamentalists in Indian, and Islamists in Pakistan, desired to impact their country's foreign policy and worldwide relations.

Our reviews of the political positions of religious leaders in the two nations allow us to determine that religious leadership' impact in regards to the worldwide relations of Indian and Pakistan is at times significant. Their primary technique is to try to impact government foreign policy, enhanced, when they are available, by tries to build transnational systems of religious believers; for example, in regards to Kashmir. What this means is more generally that the soft power religious beliefs is a varying that should not be neglected. However, this is not to point out that religious soft power is always the most important aspect in the regional global relation. But it does underline how in each of the local nations are analyzed, household components and procedures toss up politically significant religious leader that aim to impact worldwide results, although they are by no means assured success. They are, however, likely to be greatest when spiritual soft power works together with 'secular' hard Power.

## 6. References

- Ali, T. (1999). *The panic button*. London: The Guardian.
- Bhatt, C. (2001). *HinduNationalism:Origins,IdeologiesandModern Myths*. Oxford: Berg.
- Bidwai, P. (2003). *Critical moment for India*. New Dehli: Oxfordd University Press.
- Brass, P. (2005). *The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence in ContemporaryIndia*. Seattle: UniversityofWashington Press.
- Cady, & Simon, S. (2007). *Religion and Conflict in South and South-East Asia: Disrupting Violence*. London: Routledge.
- Chiriyankandath. (2006). *Hinduism and politics* (pp. 48–58. ed.). London: Routledge.
- Cohen. (2004). *The Idea of Pakistan*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.
- Diamond. (1999). *Developing Democracy: Towards Consolidation*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Feng, H. (2007). *Chinese Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Confucianism, Leadership and War*. London : Routledge .
- Ganguly, S. (2003/4). India's foreign policy grows up. *World Policy Journal*, pp. 41–47.
- Haggerty, D. (2002). *Ethnicity and Religion in International Politics: The Middle East, the Balkans, and India-Pakistan*. New Dehli: Consortium of Social Science Associations Congressional Briefing. Retrieved from [www.cossa.org/ethnicity.htm](http://www.cossa.org/ethnicity.htm).
- Harrison, S. (2001). Pakistan: the destabilisation game. *Le Monde Diplomatique*, pp. 17–18.
- Hussain, K. (2024). From pulpit to marketplace: The evolution of religious political parties in Pakistan. *World Affairs*, 187(2), 151-160.
- Iqbal, M., Bashir, N., & Ali, I. (2023). An Analysis of the Evaluation of Islamic Laws in Pakistan from 1988 to 1999. *Qlantic Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities*, 4(4), 123-133.
- Kainat, W., & Buzdar, M. A. (2023). Factors Promoting Religious Socialization among Secondary Schools Students. *Pakistan Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences*, 11(2), 2715-2722.
- Kalaiyaran, A., & Vijayabaskar, M. (2021). *The Dravidian model: Interpreting the political economy of Tamil Nadu*. Cambridge University Press.

- Kapila, S. (2005, January 17). India's foreign policy challenges 2005: A perspective analysis. *South Asia Analysis Group*. Retrieved February 5, 2018, from Kapila, S. (2005) 'India's foreign policy challenges 2005: A perspective analysis', South Asia Analysis Group, 17 January. Available at: <http://www.saag.org/papers13/paper1223.html>. Accessed 10 January 2006.
- Katyala, K. (2004, July-September 5). Issues and trends in Indian elections. *South Asian Journal*. Retrieved February 2, 2018, from [www.southasianmedia.net/Magazine/Journal/previousissues5.htm](http://www.southasianmedia.net/Magazine/Journal/previousissues5.htm)
- Katzman, K. (2002). *Terrorism: Near Eastern groups and state sponsors*. Congress Research Service Report for Congress. Retrieved January 9, 2018, from [www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31119.pdf](http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31119.pdf)
- Malik, I. (2002). *Religious Minorities in Pakistan*. London: Minority Rights Group International.
- Marshall. (2004). Hinduism and terror', First Things. *Religion and Public Life*. Retrieved February 11, 2018, from <http://www.freedomhouse.org/religion/country/india/Hinduism%20and%20Terror.htm>.
- Lasa, B. D. Q. (2024). *Sarbat Da Bhala: Sikh Immigrants and the Prosperity of the Multitude* (Doctoral dissertation, Washington State University).
- Marshall, P. (2003). *Radical Islam's move on Africa*. Washington: The Washington Post.
- McCarthy, R. (2002). *Pearl trial told how Briton drove off with journalist*. London: The Guardian.
- Mitra, S. (2010 ). *Politics in India: Structure, Process and Policy*. London: Routledge.
- Nasr, S. (2001). *The Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of State Power*. Oxford : Oxford University Press.
- Ram-Prasad, C. (2000). *Hindu nationalism and the international relations of India*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Sardar, Z. (1985). *Islamic Futures. The Shape of Ideas to Come*. London; New York: Mansell Publishing.
- Smock, D. (2006). *Religious Contributions to Peacemaking: When Religion Brings Peace, Not War*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.
- Shome, P. (2023). India's Caste Structure. In *The Creation of Poverty and Inequality in India* (pp. 138-176). Bristol University Press.
- Tankel. (2009). *Lashkar-e-Taiba: From 9/11 to Mumbai*. London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, Kings College.
- Thirumalai. (2001, May 3). Language and culture in India's foreign policy. *Language in India. Strength for Today and Bright Hope for Tomorrow*. Retrieved January 22, 2018, from [www.languageinindia.com/may2001/foreign.html](http://www.languageinindia.com/may2001/foreign.html)
- Tyndale, W. (2004). Religions and the Millennium Development Goals: Whose agenda. *Religion and Development*. Netherlands: Oxford university press.
- Wang, Z., Luo, Y., Cao, X., & Jiang, J. (2024). The twisted path to sacredness: a grounded theory study of irrational religious orientation and its psycho-sociological implications. *BMC psychology*, 12(1), 360-375.





Weiss, G. (2011). *The Cage: The fight for Sri Lanka & the Last Days of the Tamil Tigers*. London: Bodley Head.

Whetsell, T. A., Prebble, M., Raadschelders, J. C., Pedersen, K. Z., Ansell, C., Han, H., ... & Moore, M. H. (2025). Roundtable: Perspectives on The Public. *Perspectives on Public Management and Governance*, gvaf006.

Yahuda, M. (2011). *The International Politics of the Asia Pacific*. London : Routledge.