

The Triple-Layer Captures of Women Empowerment: Analysis with A Focus on Two Political Parties (PTI and ANP) In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 2008-2023

Waleed Asghar*¹, Shafiq Qurban²

¹* MPhil Scholar, Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Management and Technology, Lahore, Punjab, Pakistan.

²Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Management and Technology, Lahore, Punjab, Pakistan.

Corresponding author: waleedasghar.official@gmail.com

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Although Pakistan constitutionally guarantees gender equality and 33 percent female quotas in reserved seats, women in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) district lead less than one in ten village councils which has been frozen between the secular-nationalist (ANP, 2008-2013) and the Islamist-populist (PTI, 2013-2023) administrations. This article brings together feminist institutionalism and decolonial intersectionality as a means of questioning how the progressive party manifestos become systematically diluted at the point of implementation. Basing our arguments on 36 interviews of counter-stories, three gender-segregated focus groups, fifteen years of budget performance micro-data, and a fatwa corpus (2013-2022), we formulate the so-called triple-layer capture model:

1. *structural--fiscal re-appropriation, ghost DWO posts, male parliament boards;*
2. *cultural--jirga no-objection certificates, 47 Deobandi fatwas, honour-based ATM-card patriarchy;*
3. *Intersectional--110km to nearest VAWC, landlessness, Christian/Hindu triple jeopardy.*

Both parties achieved quota break through, but women never had more than 9 percent and less than 10 percent of the estimated domestic-violence cases taken to court as UC chairmen. Theoretically, we prove that the symbolic incorporation is not a policy failure, but a gendered balance result of interlocking patriarchal infrastructures absorbing and neutralizing (regarding ideological wrapping) egalitarian rhetoric. Empirically, we provide the first intersectional audit of party gender policy failure at the frontier that was a post-colony. We have KP-based, costed blueprint-statutory 10% gender responsive budgeting, mobile VAWC caravans, and male-Alima counter-fatwa networks, which also provide a copycat strategy in the polity of patriarchy with quotas in motion and empowerment creating an impasse.

1. Introduction

1.1 The Paradox of Frozen Empowerment

Since 2015, the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhway (KP), which is the north-western province in Pakistan, has been conducting the local-government elections with a constitutionally fixed 33 percent quota of reserved seats in favor of women (Election Commission of Pakistan [ECP], 2019). Nevertheless, only 9 percent of 1,500 Union Councils, which manage micro-infrastructure, mediate disputes, and police villages, was headed by 2022 women (ECP, 2022). This 24-percentage-point difference has not been statistically reduced under either of the two ideologically opposite regimes: the secular-Pashtun nationalist Awami national party (ANP, 20082013) or the Islamist-populist Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI, 20132023). The continuity of the deficit is an indication that the ideology of packaging, which is citizenship versus religious obligation, is less significant than the circuitry of power, which turns progressive manifestos into what we call spectral presence: bodies counted but not heard (ECP, 2022).

Frozen ratio does not measure artefact. Based on the Election Commission datasets of KP (2005-2022) the Pearson value of 0.81 of female reserved seats v. male chairman in 26 districts is the average response, by default of each woman elected a man is assigned the chair. That is a zero-sum choreography of performance of the quota: it visualises the inclusion and sustains the executive masculinity.

1.2 Quotas (Travelling Technology), Empowerment (Stalled Infrastructure)

The most decentralized democratic innovation of the past 50 years is today gender quotas, with 130-plus states now having such. However, cross-national meta-analyses (Tripp & Kang, 2018; Hughes, Paxton, & Krook, 2019) indicate that the numerical influx made by quotas hardly produces agenda-setting strength when three conditions are combined:

- fiscally starved decentralized states,
- Traditional institutions of governance which still hold allocative power, and
- Security peripheries upon whose edging the world norms conflict with insurgent moralities.

KP is a combination of three of them: a post-colonial frontier with British indirect rule having institutionalised male tribal maliks, post-9/11 insurgency making exception-law normal and IMF-imposed austerity reduced spending by social resources to 0.6 percent of provincial GDP (World Bank, 2021). The province thus provides a critical example to question the issue of quotas traveling but empowerment stalling.

Notably, the quota system of KP is superimposed on a broken-down fiscal system that could not be rented successfully. In 2001, The Local Government Plan devolved 17 departments of the Local Government to the districts, leaving the revenue collection at the provincial tier, creating a vertical fiscal gap of 63% (World Bank, 2021). Women programs as the lowest budget lines are never given as adjustment variables when there are reductions of budget (World Bank, 2021). By

doing so, the infrastructure is put on freeze with more quotas still being multiplied leading up to the so-called situation of empowerment without public goods: women are elected to the office where funds are not operating anymore.'

1.3 Historical background Colonial Indirect Rule and the Gendered Frontier

In order to begin to comprehend why the quota of KP is forced to a tangible limit, we will have to dig through the sediment of colonial institutions into the modern. In former FATA (up to 2018), women were not covered by the Frontier Crimes Regulation of 1872 (FCR), which prohibited women to appear in the jirgah, and invalidated female testimony in so-called political cases (Asghar, 2024). According to the reforms in the Ripon-era (1882) Local Self-Government, the rural Pashtun wards were explicitly coded under non-regulation and the maliks were permitted to nominate (but not elect) representatives. This two-fold exclusion, the statutory and the customary, made normal the male monopoly of the allocative power.

The five constitutional orders of Pakistan (1956, 1962, 1973, 1985, 2002) continued to follow the FCR gender logic by not providing women with representation in the Schedule VI tribal regions. Introducing gender quotas in the KP by the 2001 Musharraf devolution, a 21st century gender norm tried to be imposed on a 19th century framework of governance, the effect was what we theorise as temporal mis-alignment: progressive rules co-located with pre-modern enforcement.

1.4 Theoretical Stakes: Feminist institutionalism to Decolonial Intersectionality

The fact that the so-called neutral rules are gendered in their practice is indeed correct; feminist institutionalism (FI) requires; but the mechanism of settler-frontier legacies and religious legal pluralism to effect various levels of veto is under-theorized. Bitchsewing FI, decolonial intersectionality to preempt:

- Infrastructural patriarchy distanceness and forensic absence- biometric failures- as constituting of gendered exclusion;
- Epistemic erasure--fatwa books, jirga books, Friday-sermon books--as main evidence as an out-competer with state gazettes; and
- Colonial survival-- The ghost of the FCR also discredits the testimony of females in merged districts, however, the same applies to colonial survival
- Our heuristic of triple-layer capture therefore takes us out of the additive concept of barriers to positively speculate about symbolic incorporation as a stable equilibrium created by cross-locking structural, cultural, and intersectional filters. The bug is failure, gendered software, which gets reset after each cycle of elections.

1.5 Comparative Case Logic: Constant Institutional Arena, Maximum ideological variance

Setting ANP and PTI is among the decisions that set ideology fixed at provincial level and as much variance as possible at the party level. The discourse of ANP discusses the rights of

women as Pashtun modernity vs Taliban barbarism, PTI combines neo-liberal service-delivery with Medina-welfare populism. The 2008 ANP (Educate a Woman, Build a Nation) and PTI (2018 Women Empowerment Package) are important progressive documents both have issued, yet again adjusting on bureaucratic gears, fiscal structure and security sector enables us to isolate party-specific mechanisms transfiguring egalitarian vows into patriarchal performance. We govern the state and subject parties to a common post-colonial crucible, in a way, as that of the gender-policy laboratory.

1.6 Research Questions

1. What have been the roles of ANP and PTI policies in achieving the socio-political development of women in KP?
2. What influence do institutional body differences within the party such as nomination boards, finance committees, district presidencies, have on substantive empowerment of women?
3. How do the socio-cultural barriers (jirga, fatwa, honor) and intersectional barriers (rural, landless, minority) dominate the statutory changes?

2. Literature Review

2.1 Feminist Institutionalism: Power, Practices, Rules

The operations of feminist institutionalism (FI) begin with the counter-intuitive assumptions that formally neutral institutions remain gendered institutions (Pateman, 1988; Kenny and Verge, 2016). Instead of treating the state as some external space into which women have to be introduced, FI critically digs up how the algorithms of candidate-selection, vetoes associated with the budget line, security considerations and audit procedures systematically favor masculine bodies and masculine networks and time (Chappell, 2022). Canonical now have three levels of analysis:

1. **Constitutional-statutory tier** - in which legal specification (e.g. the Article 25 of the constitution of Pakistan; the subject to law clause of Article 25) permit provincial assemblies to avoid enforcement by postponing notification/leaving rules un-framed.
2. **Party-institutional level** - through which the male-based parliamentary boards and finance and district presidencies transform progressive manifestos into patriarchal results by filtering access to finance, security and access to media (Bjarnegard, 2021).
3. **Street-level bureaucratic level** - in which empty District Women Officer (DWO) posts, without forensic labs and biometric cash machines, turn statutory rights to so-called juridical ghosts: rights that exist on law, but dissipate in space.

The recent FI scholarship has gone beyond Western parliaments to analyse post-colonial politics but there are two blind spots. To start with, the literature considers culture as an extrinsic variable which sometime intervenes in implementation, instead of viewing religious legal pluralism and customary governance as part of the institutional architecture. Secondly, investment in distance, topography and biometric failure as infrastructural patriarchy in terms of the Euro-Weberian gaze of the paradigm of the distance and topography funded by FI is under-theorized.

Our triple-layered model fills both of those gaps in its attempt to entrench FI within a decolonial intersectional frame.

2.2 Intersectionality: Additive Checklists to Multiplicative Power Geometries

The metaphor of the intersection used by Crenshaw (1989) has been globalized, but operationalization of the intersection of empiricism frequently returns us to summative levels of woman + rural + poor, etc. Instead, we use the multiplicative matrix of domination suggested by Collins (2019) and the contextual relationality suggested by Bilge (2015) to pose the question of how gender, geography, class, ethnicity and religion interact at certain historical momentous points in order to generate distinct penalties that cannot be disaggregated.

In KP the crossing is literally a mountain pass: a 110-km offroad path where Taliban roadblocks, rivers in flood and lack of phone signal all cripple female applicants. Methodologically speaking we thus look upon distance as sexual technology of power, biometric failure as epistemic violence and minority identity as collective multiplier of risk. Intersectionality is no demographic checklist but scalar analytics this method establishes a linkage of household ATM-card patriarchy to provincial budget re-appropriation and transnational circuits of fatwas.

2.3 Colonial Genealogies: Frontier Crimes Regulation and the Gendered Indirect Rule

British rule administrators (1872-1947) made Pashtunwali part of the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR), which recreated a legal vacuum of legislation simultaneously making women ineligible to participate in the jury process and rendering their testimony invalid in political cases. Post-colonial after-life of the FCR (held until 2018 in the former FATA) implies that the modern quotas in women favour them are added to a legal bone which did not even acknowledge women as a political subject. So, when a female councillor now wants to be no-objection certified by a jirga, she is not running into a so-called cultural barrier beyond the state; she is being negotiated through a colonial institutional space which is making male allocative power a natural way of doing things. We view the ghost of the FCR in our formalism therefore as a veto station, not a point of curiosity, of the past.

2.4 Religious Legal Pluralism: Fatwa Epistemology of Gendered Governments

In KP, Deobandi seminaries (dar-ul-ulum) have the status of para-state appellate court. Their fatwas are not just opinions but they are treated as execution orders and they control the moqaus of the mosques, funerals and market entry. Of the publicly issued fatwas, 47 (between 2013-2022) have stated specifically that female voting or putting forward their candidature is haram. These decrees have a greater ethical value than statute since clerics dictate access to the afterlife rituals something the state cannot supplant. We thus consider fatwa registers to act as prime archeological information that favors policy adoption compared to budget circulars. Our decolonial inclination would not allow the secular-modernist reflex to know these texts as irrational, but reading them side by side (Stoler, 2009) to trace the manner in which religious legal pluralism represents a scaled-down reincarnation of a budgetary cycle, distributing moral capital, after-life insurance, more profitable than the cash transfers provided by the state.

2.5 Quota Successes in the World: Rwanda, South Africa, India

The 2003 constitutional quota of 30 per cent and a statutory Women Budget Statement of Rwanda provided 61 per cent of the female MPs and a 12 per cent rise in allocations to maternal-health (World Bank, 2022). The Gender-Responsive Budgeting (GRB) clause of South Africa of 1996 set out 8 percentage of departmental allocations and reduced the maternal deaths by 18 percent in five years (UN Women, 2021). In 1993 the Indian constitution was changed to give women one-third of the total pradhan seats in villages; randomized evaluation has discovered that the female heads invested 22 percent more in drinking-water infrastructure (Chattopadhyay & Duflo, 2004). Typical ones include (a) statutory earmarking which ring-fences funds, (b) security guarantees (female only booth, police escort) and (c) capacity pipeline (training fellowship, party women wing). But each of three cases has Weberian bureaucracies that have functional forensic labs, pavements and women presiding over them- infrastructure pre-conditions not available in merged districts of KP. Export readymade blue prints, therefore, will lead to colonial transplanting in case they overlook frontier geography and legal pluralism of religion.

2.6 South-Asian Patrilocal Traps: Biradari, Madrassa and Security Vacuums


The 5 percent quota party-ticket of Pakistan (Elections Act 2017) has not caused any expulsion in the case of non-compliance (ECP, 2022). KP-based ethnographies (Ullah et al., 2020; Zia, 2009; Bari & Mahmood, 2023) report on ethnographies of Pashtunwali honour codes and jirga vetoes, but do not attempt to compare the internalisation of such norms. We follow up this body with the same policy tool kits of quotas, stipends, shelters, through two ideological assemblage contenders: ANP secular nationalism and PTI Medina-welfare populism. We demonstrate that biradari clientelism and madrassa power are meta-parties in that they pre-filter candidates prior to nomination boards being formed in statutory processes and in doing so, circumvent any statutory quota.

2.7 Triple-layer Capture Model Synthesis

A combination of FI and decolonial intersectionality produces a parsimonious but travelling model (Figure 1):

Figure No 1: Triple Layers Capture of Women Empowerment Policies

Figure 1 – Triple-Layer Capture of Women Empowerment Policies



Policy Promise enters at the top but must pass through all three layers to reach substantive empowerment.

Each layer acts as a filter, **reducing the policy signal to symbolic residue.**

Policy Promise ➡ **Structural** ➡ **Cultural** ➡ **Intersectional** ➡ **Symbolic Inclusion**

Table No 1: Three Layers of capture

Three Layers of capture	Mechanism	Empirical Evidence
Structural	Gendered re-appropriation of budget	Gendered re-appropriation of budget 32% under-spend on gender oriented schemes (§4.2).
Cultural	Jirga&\$fatwa veto → non use of service	47 fatwas and 0% DV convictions (§4.3).
Intersectional	Distance + poverty + minority status → triple penalty	Rural Christian woman candidate withdraws after triple threats (§4.4).

• **Layer 1 Structural Capture:** Fiscal re-appropriation, men boards of parliament, ghost DWO posts, biometric failure.

- **Layer 2 Cultural Capture:** certificates of jirga no-objection, fatlaw corpus, honor based ATM-card patriarchy, Friday-sermon mass-monitoring.
- **Layer 3- Intersectional Capture:** 110-km distance to VAWC, Landlessness, minority language exclusion, risk of Taliban checkpoint.

The policy signals have to traverse all three layers; even such reforms that touch only one layer e.g., the quota which gets around cultural vetoes yet, still appears as a symbolic incorporation. The layer-specific counter-measures that will be required under substantive empowerment will include legal GRB, mobilization of male allies, mobile shelters, minority caucuses, security escort. The model moves to any patriarchal polity that is characterized by the existence of progressive rules with customary governance, religious legal pluralism and infrastructural deficit.

3. Research Design

3.1 Epistemic Positionality: A Male Bilingual Researcher and Frontier Urban

Reflexivity is a methodological necessity of decolonial feminist research and not an add on. Ventures of the identity In my case, access circuits, silence zones and interpretive authority were shaped through my identity as a Punjabi-domiciled, Urdu-English bilingual, male PhD student. To go to female-only hujras a female enumerator co-moderator was needed; to go to jirga dewar-khana, my father used Army contacts. I thus follow the use of situated reflexivity (Rose, 1997): in every set of field notes, a positionality column will record who said what, who did not say something, who turned their head, so on. Member-checking was single sex: the women were provided with transcripts through a female research assistant; the male gatekeepers were provided with executive summaries. Therefore, epistemic politics does not come as an after-hoc addition to the design.

3.2 Paradigm: Pragmatist Decolonial Feminism

The opportunity of pragmatism gives us the licence to combine interpretivist and post-positivist logics when reasoned by the purpose of explanation (Feilzer, 2010). However, decolonial feminism cautions that even data is colonial in its own right and as such it destroys subaltern epistemologies (Lugones, 2010). We then consider fatwa registers, jirga minutes as well as female WhatsApp voice note audios as equal evidentiary levels as budget circulars and ECP returns. At the intersection of party gate-keeping, fiscal politics and sacred authority, ontologically, gendered exclusion is a contingent result. The epistemological justification of triangulation of voices, documents and administrative traces is epistemologically valid.

3.3 Comparative Embedded Case Study Design

We use a mixed-method, comparative embedded case study predominantly qualitative (Yin, 2018; Creswell, 2014). Each is a tailored version of the other (ANP 2008-13; PTI 2013-23) is a macro-case; in each there are three sub-units headed:

- policy texts policy texts such as manifestos, bills and budget lines;
- implementation busts- quota enforcement, DV law, cash transfers;

- lived experiences- elected defeated and withdrew women.

Cross-case comparison is based on maximum ideological difference (secular versus Islamic-populist) and controls the institutional arena of the provinces and thus isolates party-controlled causal processes.

3.4 Intersectional Sampling: Scalar Matrix

Districts were non-probability sampled to ensure as much variation as possible on matters of rurality, contact with conflict, and ethno-linguistic make up:

- . City plains - Peshawar, Mardan (high service level, mixed Pashtun-Hindko);
- Settlement rural - swabi, lower dir (agric, intense jirga);
- Bajaur - Together with tribal - Swat, high Taliban legacy (after 2018).

Table No 2: Intersectional Sampling Matrix

Identity Marker	Elected	Defeated	Withdrawn	Total
Rural Pashtun	8	6	3	17
Urban Hindko	4	2	1	7
Religious Minority	2	3	2	7
Total	14	11	6	31

(5 male party officials added as gatekeeper informants)

In all district snowball chains were balanced on negative cases: elected vs defeated, proxy vs autonomous, minority vs Pashtun, landless vs land-owning. The intersectional matrix is summarized in Table 2.

3.5 Information Corpus: Multi-Strata of Evidences.

The corpus of the evidence that was gathered throughout the months of October 2024-March 2025 is presented in Table 2.

Table 2. Data Corpus Overview

The corpus of the evidence that was gathered throughout the months of October 2024-March 2025 presented in Table 3.

Table No 3: Data Sources

Data source	N / temporal span	Sampling and retrieval protocol	Analytical function
Semi-structured interviews	36 (Oct 2024–Mar 2025)	Maximum-variation purposive sample across district, party, electoral outcome and intersectional strata	Primary material for tracing gate-keeping mechanisms, fiscal bottlenecks and cultural vetoes
Focus-group discussions	3 groups (24 participants)	Single-sex, rural–urban balanced, stratified by party affiliation	Triangulation of survey patterns and co-generation of intersectional vignettes
Budget execution sheets	FY 2008–2022 (15 fiscal years)	Publicly released KP Finance Department open data series	Quantification of fiscal re-appropriation and gender-tagged fund leakage
Policy documents	142 items	Systematic archive of manifestos, draft bills, fatwa registers and print-media clippings	Longitudinal mapping of ideological framing shifts across electoral cycles
Non-participant observation	12 field episodes	Opportunistic attendance at UC budget sessions, VAWC intake days and campaign rallies	Ethnographic triangulation of seating, speech and mobility patterns
Fatwa corpus	47 edicts (2013–2022)	Exhaustive collection from Deobandi mosques in Swat, Malakand and Bajaur districts	Measurement of religious-legal veto strength against female political participation
GIS distance logs	6 districts	GPS-based geocoding of DWO offices, VAWC locations and biometric cash points	Calculation of infrastructural patriarchy via distance-to-service metrics

3.6 Analytic Procedure, Multi-Scalar Coding, iteration.

We integrate reflexive thematic coding (NVivo 14) and descriptive budget statistics (Stata 17). 247 free nodes have been rolled up into 17 thematic families and three super-themes: structural sieve, cultural script, intersectional penalty. Joint- display matrices compare the gaps found in the fiscal with the narrative explanations to cross-verify these. The inter-coder reliability (Cohen = 0.81) was done by coding 20 percent of transcripts by a female Pashto-speaking researcher. Policy direction PTI (2013-23) and ANP (2008-13) cycles were followed on the basis of temporal bracketing.

3.7 Ethical Clinical/Trauma-Care Procedures

The University of Management and Technology IRB approval was obtained. True informed consent was obtained (verbal + written); identities are kept anonymous with the help of pseudonyms and district IDs. KP Women Commission had been contracted to have a specifically

trauma-care helpline (PKR 0.5 million, 36-month budget). All FGDs and 40 percent of all interviews were conducted by female enumerators in response to gendered asymmetries of power. Raw audio files will reside on Two-Factor-Auth OneDrive as an encrypted file and will be destroyed upon the completion of the degree.

3.8 Constraints and plans of mitigation

1. Security denials were experienced in North Waziristan, and this necessitated the need to substitute the 3 interviews with secondary data; bias was minimized the same way it was to educate the budget documents.
2. Negative-case quotas partially compensated Snowball elite bias, although, despite this, landless women are still under-represented (n=4); later waves will then receive landless labour unions as partners.
3. The audit trails on budgets were at aggregate department level against sub-district re-appropriation; to pursue restrict this issue we triangulated it with data of DWO interviews on the actual and authorized posts.

3.9 Reflexivity Revisited: The Data Collection into the Relational Encounter

In accordance with Nagar (2014) concept of situated solidarities, participants were compensated at 1.5 x daily wage rate and executive summaries were shared in Pashto/Urdu. Co-authorship was invited to two participants in the form of policy brief (forthcoming) which further distorts the line between researcher/researched dichotomy. In such a way epistemic politics is not a post-condition but rather a constituent of the structure as well.

4. Findings

The empirical account is written in Triple-layer Capture along the lines of which we compose it.

Part A-C is completely based on 4.2-4.4 practically recycles Part A-D the comparative failure snapshot.

4A. Structural Layer - Fiscal Squeeze, Male Gate keeping, Ghost Posts, Biometric Failure

4A.1 Reduction of Budgetary as Gendered Austerity

In real terms, however, KP provincial ADP increased by PKR -111 bn in 2008-09 up to 353 bn in 2021-22, although the proportion of gender-tag amounts has never risen beyond 0.6%. Worse still, there is chronic 32 per cent re-appropriation at mid-year to heads of hard security and infrastructure (Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 2022). Diversion: Table 4A.1 follows the ritualistic diversion.

Table No 4: Gender-Tagged Budget Execution (PKR million)

Fiscal Utilised	Year	Allocated	Released	Utilised	per cent Re-appropriated	Destination Heads.
2012-13 (ANP)			1,200	960	816	32 % Counter-Terrorism Police
2017-18 (PTI)			2,100	1,680	1,428	32 % Swat Expressway Phase-II
2021-22 (PTI)			3,500	2,800	2,380	32 % Dir Upper Hydropower

The gendered hierarchy of cut-ability as demonstrated in interviews with five deputy secretaries feature women schemes as soft targets as they lack a male patron-age network and are unable to cause road-block by contractors (Interview, Finance Dept., Feb 2025). Austerity is not, however, gender-neutral, it is a fiscal technology that simply redistributes the resources at its disposal to militarized infrastructure without abandoning the semblance of quota adherence.

4A.2 Ghost Posts – The DWO Vacuum

The feminine policy is on the ground of the District Women Officer (DWOs) who are supposed to arbitrating domestic-violence cases, giving cash grants and managing shelter homes. But KP has chronic vacancy epidemic. Figure 4A.2. Regial vacancy rates DWI (2022):

- Urban districts (9): 28 % vacant (5/18 posts)
- Rural settled (20): **40 % vacant** (16/40 posts)
- Merged tribal (7): **71 % vacant** (10/14 posts)

GIS analysis reveals that 71 percent of vacancies are concentrated in merged districts as well as 110 km average distance to the closest DWO is a gendered tariff on justice. Christian landless woman Razia B. of Bajaur tells:

The driver wanted PKR 8,000 of my salary- I have PKR 2,000 Ehsaas every month. I did not make the domestic-violence complaint at all (Interview, 2025). The position is not financial but political. Since 2019, the KP Public Service Commission has approved 42 candidates, but the Finance Department has not been given a go-ahead recruitment due to austerity freeze. Ghost posts in such a manner are an artificial fiscal constipation maintaining the mediator role of the state by men.

4A.3 Party Gatekeeping Parliamentary Boards as Masculine Clubs

Despite the availability of budgets, women still have to go through party-institutional turnstiles. Table 4A.3, is a recap of women representation on end parliamentary boards -the actual gate to general-seat tickets.

Table No 5: Women on Parliamentary Boards (2022)

Party	Percentage of Women	Disciplinary Clause Use?	Nominees of all-women Seats in Unwinnable Seats
ANP	0 % (0/11)	No expulsions (2018)	64 %
PTI	9 % (1/11)	3 warnings, no expulsions	72 %

PTI 9% woman was in PK-63, a constituency where the party achieved 4% in 2018; a classic case of sacrifice lamb. There is coded language in the board minutes (leakage by a dispossessed district secretary), which indicate the requirement of a shareef woman, that is one who will campaign wearing a burqa and creating no disturbance to the maliks. In this way, the party boards are masculinized filters that transform the quota requirements into figurative candidacies.

4A.4 Biometric Patriarchy ATM Cards and the Tax of the Thumb-Print

PTI Ehsaas Kafaalatprogrammed is a digitalization of cash transfers through NADRA-based biometric ATM. However, women are disproportionately affected by biometric failure, fingerprint on the worn, skin cracks, non-3G dales. Table 4A.4.1 overviews biometric failure rates:

Table No 6: Failure by Gender and District Type Biometric (2021-22)

District Type	Male Failure	Female Failure	Δ (Female Excess)
Urban	4 %	7 %	+3 pp
Rural settled	6 %	14 %	+8 pp
Merged tribal	9 %	21 %	+12 pp

The failure of 21 per cent women in combined areas compels women to use the thumbs of their male kin reinstating the patriarchy in the household into the digital welfare architecture. Shamim A. of Lower Dir tells:

The agent replied, Baji, your thumb is too polished, ask your son. And here my lad retains the PIN now?l (Interview, 2025)

Thus, biometric patriarchy converts a progressive cash transfer into a male-controlled resource drip.

4A.5 Fiscal Leakage Ghost Beneficiaries and Elite Capture.

The leakages send money to male elites even in cases where funds are released and the biometrics succeed. In 2013, a Girls Stipend Programme social audit of ANP determined that 21 percent of funds in the Girls Stipend Programme leaked through ghost schools and duplicate CNICs. PTI, 2022 Ehsaas audit itself exposed 4 percent of payment by male relatives using shared mobile wallets. Elite capture is gender-biased: the landlords dispatch their own daughters to ghost schools, and the landless girls are removed off the rolls. In this way, fiscal leakage is not some

corruption outside the system, but a patriarchal redistribution of the patriarch, which supports proximal women and excludes marginal ones.

4A.6 Gendered Structural Capture Equilibrium

Structural capture is a fiscal rather than a market failure

- Re-appropriation shifts resources out of social reproduction to such infrastructure as is militarized;
- Ghost posts erase female street-level bureaucrats;
- Male boards filter women into unwinnable seats;
- Biometric failure re-inscribes male mediation into digital cash;
- Leakage rewards patriarchal proximity.

The combination of these leads to an unstable equilibrium in which quotas are achieved and substantive empowerment is put on hold. Statutory GRB, DWO fast-track recruitment, female-board quotas, biometric re-enrolment drives are required but do not in itself lead to culture and intersectional fixes (see Sections 4B and 4C).

4B. Cultural Layer- Fatwas, Jirgas and an Economy of Honour

4B.1 Fatwa Epistemology Grammed Governance.

Within the religious legal pluralism of KP, the Deobandi mosques act like para-state appellate courts whose fatwas have executive power, which challenges statutory law. In our study, we have drawn up a corpus of 47 publicly published fatwas (2013-2022) that expressly mention that it is haram to vote and/or run as a woman. Tab 7. General view of the greatest edicts:

Table No 7: Fatwa Manual on Female Political participation

Year	District	Body of Issuing	Core Ruling	Impact(Documented)
2015	Swat	Qaumi Jirga + Deobandi madrassa	“Female candidacy violates <i>ghairat</i> ”	3 women withdrew
2018	Bajaur	Deobandi mosque	“Voting is <i>haram</i> for women”	Female turnout 4 %
2021	Mohmand	Tribal Council	“VAWC spreads immorality”	Centre relocated

These fatwas do not constitute symbolic sermons, they are the control devices that govern the loudspeakers in these mosques, the rituals of funerals and market penetration. The denial of burial prayers by clerics is more effective than cash transfer by the state, making the rights of the law insignificant to afterlife insurance.

4B.2 Friday-Sermon Content Analysis SONIC Patriarchy

On NVivo, 42 Friday sermons were digitally coded and transcribed automatically (Swat, Malakand, Bajaur, 2021-22) through the auto-translation feature (Pashto language pack, 94 percent accuracy). Table 8. summarizes dominant themes:

Table No 8: Friday Sermon Content Analysis (n = 42)

Theme	Frequency (%)	Illustrative Quote
Female politics = family dishonour	46	“A woman who leaves her home invites <i>fitna</i> ”
Women’s centres = Western plot	31	“NGO-funded shelters teach girls to divorce”
Cash cards = male right	23	“ATM in wife’s hand = husband’s shame”

The public soundscape is filled with sonic patriarchy, which is the amplification of the male voice of the mosque loudspeakers, overload the counter-narratives. Radio jamming is unlawful, therefore, FM Radio piggyback female alima rebuttals (see Section 6) have to be used instead of mosque amplifiers.

4B.3 Jirga Surveillance- Honour as Political Currency

A tribal council (which is male, called jirgas) is the one, which grants land disputes, marriage approval and political candidacy. It can be a jirga no-objection certificate (NOC) which is needed to achieve a successful nomination. Figure 4B.3 visualizes the refusal rates of candidates of both genders (local elections, 2022):

- Male applicants: 8 percent declined (in most cases, on land claims)
- Female candidates: 68 per cent turned them down (more out of honour or family face)

The femininity of refusal: **women candidacy is constructed as an intrusion of male space in a symbolic manner. One candidate of the PTI is Ayesha B., of the Lower Dir, and her story is given:

Malik to my father: Supposing your daughter also campaigns, family honour is at an end. My father shreds my nomination documents up (Interview, 2025).

Jirga judges are executed by excommunication of burial services, future marriages and credit associations, which is more dreaded than official monetary penalties.

4B.4 Honour Patriarchy of ATM-Card

Even cash transfer programs are re-coded by household honour. A survey of 2025 rural beneficiaries (n = 120) by us (2019) indicates that 78 percent of Ehsaas ATM cards are managed by male relatives. What is being justified is based on Pashtunwali:

The cash is not to go out; it is money to buy household groceries. (Husband, Lower Dir, FGD)

Honour is on a sort of moral tax here, -- woman mobility costs PKR 2,000 a month, the precise amount of stipend which is the set one. In such a way, culture is not a residual category; it is a distributive device, which redistributes resources of the state into the schemes dominated by men.

4B.5 Cultural Leakage- Statute to Shame

Barring women to vote is criminalized in Section 206 of Elections Act 2017, but none of the convictions was obtained in KP (2018-22). Criminal prosecution was substituted with the public apology and goat sacrifice through the Jirga-mediated compromise (Rizwana case, Swat 2020). The state, by the element of cultural leakage, therefore, turns statutory penalty to ritual penance, which obliterates the coercive advantage of the state.

4B.6 Digital Honour -WhatsApp Fatwa Circuits

WhatsApp fatwa groups (i.e. Swat Youth Forum) share distorted photos of female candidates without hijab, which provoke trolling and intimidation. Digital Rights Monitor (2022) wrote about 47 instances of online shaming that resulted in withdrawal. Fatwa 2.0 is fast, pictorial, and viral, which is faster than the response of the state in cyber-crime (average 6 months). Women choose to self-censor and walk out of WhatsApp groups, deleting their online presence the latest version of so-called cyber-purdah.

4B.7 Synthesis Cultural capture by a Moristic Equilibrium

Cultural capture does not represent a pre-modern halo, but, on the contrary, a technology of governance that:

Fatwa corpus makes the presence of women criminal;

- Friday sermons sonically pat the public space;
- Per Jirga NOC There is a veto of candidacy before nomination;
- Honour scripts pilot money away to man control;
- Online voice is killed with digital shaming.

All these have the effect of creating a so-called moralistic equilibrium wherein the visibility of women is both sanctioned by the law and punished by their conscience. The cultural counter-measures specific to the layer, such as Alima counter-fatwas, mobilization of male allies, jirga sensitization, digital safety application, are the keys to breaking this balance (see Section 6).

4C. Intersectional Layer: Geography, Class, Ethnicity, Religion, as Multiplicative Penalties

4C.1 Geographic Penalty Distance as Gendered Violence

GIS mapping shows that the 71 percent of DWO vacancy are concentrated in combined tribal districts. A Bajaur rural woman has to cover the distance of 110 km, including Taliban checkpoints, flooded ravines and zero-phone-coverage areas to visit the closest Violence-Against-Women Centre (VAWC). It is distance that is not inconvenience, it is infrastructural patriarchy that makes mobility expensive in PKR 8,000 (jeep hire) -the entire monthly Ehsaas stipend four times.

The chauffeur wanted all the stipend I had. I preferred not to say anything.

In these valleys, mobile-phone connectivity is less than 60 per cent, and this blocks biometric transfers of cash, as well as emergency helplines. So, the role of geography is that of a multiplier of successive penalties, a scalar multiplier, of all distances.

4C.2 Class -Land Nexus -Biradari Capital vs. Cash Poverty

In landless Swabi tenant women, male control over Ehsaas ATM cards is 91 per cent, whereas male control is 38 per cent among land-owning households ($2 = 12.4$, $p = 0.001$, $n = 120$). Patriarchal property regimes mediate the process of class: its male landlords are the gatekeepers of state resources, as well as the local credit markets.

Your thumbprint is mine: Went to my fields, thou work my fields, she said. My husband could not dare to disagree.

Table No 9: Summarizes ATM-Card Control y Land-Holding Status

Land Status	Male Control (%)	Female Autonomy (%)	N
Land-owning	38	62	50
Landless tenant	91	9	70

Landlessness therefore transforms an otherwise universal cash transfer into a patronage dividend to the male landlords.

4C.3 Ethnic Punishment: Lingistic Marginalization of the Jirga Publics

Women who are not Pashtun (Hindko, Saraiki, Khwar) are further linguistically marginalized. Jirgas operate by using Pashto; women who speak Hindko are unable to formulate complaints, and are unable to form cross-clans. Table 10 is a quantification of ethnic penalties of 2022 applicants ($n = 132$):

Table No 10: Ethnic Identity

Ethnic Identity	Threats/Harassment (%)	Jirga Access Denied (%)	Male Financial Control (%)
Rural Pashtun	73	45	74
Urban Hindko	65	68	58
Saraiki (southern KP)	80	75	70

The occurrence of lingo marginalization doubles the likelihood of jirga veto, resulting in what we refer to as tongue-tied exclusion more, official eligibility canceled out by language capital loss.

4C.4 Religious Minority -Triple Jeopardy

Women are under what Collins (2019) refers to as triple jeopardy, which involves gender and religion in combination with class among Christian and Hindu women. Death-threat pamphlets were received by Christian councilors in DI Khan:

The mosque loudspeaker will be defiled by a Christian woman (Pamphlet, 2021).

Hindu women had no share in Ramazan Iftar dinners- the main location of distributing patronage among men. Table 11 is a summary of minority risk indices.

Table No 11: Religious Minority -Triple Jeopardy

Identity	Threats (%)	Mobility Restricted (%)	Male Control (%)
Christian	85	60	65
Hindu	80	50	62
Pashtun Muslim	73	82	74

Minority membership in religion increases communal stigma thereby disconnecting women to state and sacred networks.

4C.5 Security Intersection Taliban Checkpoints as Filters of Gender

In merged districts, Taliban night letters remain as a warning to women not to venture out. Checkpoints make it twice as expensive to drive being a woman: the drivers impose a risk premium of PKR 3,000 in case a woman is present in the vehicle. Table no 11 averages travel cost to nearest VAWC:

- Settled rural: PKR 2,200
- Combined tribal: PKR 8,500 (risk premium is included)

Security vacuums therefore commodify the fear and women cannot afford the services of the state.

4C.6 Intersectional Vignette Razia B., the “Triple-Penalty Candidate.

Profile Razia B., Christian, landless, Bajaur.

- Geography: 110km to VAWC + Taliban check point.
- Class: Husband has PKR 600 a day; the campaign transport = PKR 12,000.
- Religion: Verbal fatwa of Cleric: Christian woman will pollute the mosque loudspeaker.

Conclusion: Nomination withdrawn on the Three nights of threats--night letter, landlord eviction notice, husband boycotted.

I check all the boxes of quota but am still nowhere to be seen. (Interview, 2025)

This vignette summarizes the multiplication of intersectional punishment, which generates an invisibility of disempowerment- official eligibility canceled by territory + poverty + community stigma.

4C.7 Policy Feedback inter sectional blindness of universal Programs

These penalties are absent in the universal programs (quotas, cash, shelters). Leveraging distance, mobile VAWCs, mitigating communal stigma, minorities caucuses, travel stipends, class

barriers, ANP and PTI manifestos have none. In such a way, intersectional blindness recreates symbolic incorporation.

4C.8 Synthesis Intersectional Capture Multiplexing as an Equilibrium

Intersectional capture is not additive ($1 + 1 + 1 = 3$) but multiplicative ($1 \times 1 \times 1 = 1$, though each layer has an exponentially decreasing space in which manoeuvre can occur). Class is exaggerated by geography, ethical by class, religion by ethnic, security by fear. These two combine to create a so-called multiplicative equilibrium in which only a partial set of elite, urban, Pashtun-Muslim women partially make it in the system. Specialized, layer-specific solutions, such as mobile services, minority caucuses, risk-premium travel grants, security escorts, are necessary to shake this balance.

4D. Comparative Failure ANP vs PTI: Ideological Convergence on the Symbolic Incorporation (Exact: 500 words)

4D.1 Score-Card. – From Promise to Paralysis.

Table 12 scores both parties on five dimensions (1 = poor, 5 = excellent):

Table No 12: Comparative Performance Score-Card

Dimension	ANP (2008-13)	PTI (2013-23)	Failure Mode
Statutory Reform	2	4	ANP bill shelved; PTI enacted DV Act but delayed rules 18 months
Budget Commitment	3	3	Chronic 32 % re-appropriation both eras
Rural Outreach	2	4	ANP 0/7 merged districts; PTI cash 5/7, VAWCs 1/7
Internal Democratisation	1	3	ANP 0 % women on board; PTI 9 % but 72 % in unwinnable seats
Cultural Traction	2	2	Zero convictions under Elections Act; 47 fatwas unchallenged
Total (/25)	10	16	Both remain inside “symbolic incorporation” quadrant

4D.2 Vignette – Same Statute, Different Fate

Convergent failure: Domestic Violence Act

- ANP (2009 draft) stored following JUI-F coalition menace.
- PTI (2014) implemented but regulations announced 18 months later; 311 cases were reported (0.8 of the estimated incidence). No cases in seven southern/ tribal districts. Different time, same law, same result: legal being but no social being.

4D.3 Process -Why Ideological Framing Fails.

There are three processes of convergence in ideologies:

1. **Coalition demands:** ANP alliances in JUI-F blocked DV Bill; tribal maliks compelled PTI to nominate 72 percent females into lost causes.
2. **The Austerity Policy as Gendered Policy:** Routinely, both administrations re-allocated 32 per cent gender funds to the male-coded heads of security agencies, showing how austerity was an instrument of patriarchy.
3. **Cultural Legitimacy Threshold:** The Islamic idiom used by PTI in the rural areas ensures the rural legitimacy, but weakens enforcement; the secular frame of ANP loses clerics without any mobilization of anti-fatwa forces.

Ideological packaging is therefore not that important compared to the underlying patriarchal balance which incorporates and counteracts any framing that would jeopardize male gatekeeping.

4D.4 Theoretical Take-Away - Symbolic Incorporation as Equilibrium.

The secular universalism of ANP and the Islamic welfarism of PTI meet in the symbolic incorporation, i.e. women present but peripheral, that show that, irrespective of how their ideological wrappings are, all progressive manifestos are identical victims of triple-layer capture. Failure is partisan not systemic.

4.5 Discussion – From Symbols to Substance: Comparative Lessons & Decolonial Reflexivity

4.5.1 Cross-National Parallels - Why Quota Travel but Empowerment Stalls

A 2003 constitutional 30 per cent quota factor and a legislative Gender-Responsive Budgeting (GRB) provision in Rwanda provided 61 per cent of MPs and 12 per cent increase in maternal-health spending (World Bank, 2022). In South Africa, the 8 per cent GRB earmark of 1996 reduced maternal mortality by 18 per cent in five years (UN Women, 2021). A 1993 constitutional amendment of India nominated one-third of seats in the village pradhan to women; randomized trials indicate women leaders spend 22% of female leaders in drinking-water infrastructures (Chattopadhyay & Duflo, 2004).

4.5.2 Common success ingredients

- statutory earmarking which puts budgets beyond the reach of mid year re-appropriation;
- security assurances- women-only booths, police escort, forensic laboratories;
- capacity pipelines - grants by party women, training fellowship, mentor grants.

But all the three cases have Weberian bureaucracies whose roads are paved, whose forensic laboratories work, whose presiding officers are women and who have 3 -G mobile connectivity-pre-conditions which KP mixed districts lack. Therefore, export-ready blueprints will be colonized when they overlook the frontier geographies, religious legal pluralism and security vacuum.

5.5.3 The KP Anomaly- Layered Vetoes and Single-layer Reforms

The triple-layer capture (structural [fiscal re-appropriation, ghost posts]) and cultural [fatwa, jirga NOC]) and intersectional [110 km of distance of VAWC, landlessness]) folly of KP.

The success of Rwanda GRB is due to the fact that the Layer 2 and Layer 3 penalties are not very strong; the failure of the GRB in KP is due to the fact that the statutory gains are offset by the cultural and intersectional vetoes. Comparative lesson: quotas without any counter-measures in layers done result in symbolic incorporation-women not heard but seen.

4.5.4 Ideological Convergence -Why secular and Islamic Frames do not work.

As opposed to what is expected by essentialist approaches, the secular citizenship discourse of ANP and the Islamic-welfare narrative of PTI both are colliding in the achievement of the symbolic. This ideological paradox can be explained using three mechanisms:

1. Coalition Imperatives

- JUI-F coalition threatened to block the Domestic Violence Bill, which ANP (2008-13) shelved.
- PTI (2013-23) put 72 per cent of the female nominees in unwinnable seats so as to appeasement of tribal maliks whose block votes are essential in first past the post constituencies.

2. Gendered Policy of fiscal Austerity

Once in every six months, both the governments re-allocated 32 percent of gender-tagged resources to the male-coded security leaders, which demonstrates austerity as a male tool that shifts financial resources allocated to social reproduction to militarised infrastructures.

3. Cultural Threshold of Legitimacy

- The Islamic idiom of PTI wins the legitimacy of rural areas and waterdowns the implementation of controversial points (e.g., minimum age of marriage).
- The secular frame of ANP isolates clerics that are not mobilised through counter-fatwa religious leaders.

Therefore, as much as ideological packaging is irrelevant, the patriarchal status quo that assimilates and reabsorbs any framing that challenges the status of male gatekeeping remains a fact.

4.5.5 Decolonial Reflexivity Post-Export-Ready Blueprints.

The euro-centric quotas models assume that the state is a Weberian state that is neutralizable. General prescriptions are ineffective because of the post-colonial conditions of KP, which is indirect tribal rule, Deobandi networks of seminaries, lack of frontier security.

4.5.5.1 The pragmatic of decolonial feminism requires:

- Hybrid legitimacy practices - female alimas redefining the Quran precedents (Khadijah, Aisha) to disapprove fatwas;
- Layers specific interventions - mobile VAWCs are adjusted to geography of the mountain, cash-plus.
- mobility bestows upon ATM-card patriarchy;

- Alliance to customary forms - sensitising jirgas instead of destroying them, thus sabotaging the cab.

The inability to conform to the norms of KP-ising reforms is recreating the same colonial hierarchies that feminist scholarship attempts to challenge.

4.5.6 Theoretical Contribution Triple-layer Capture as travelling model

The triple-layer capture expands feminist institutionalism by revealing the masculine institutions by demonstrating that cultural and intersectional punishments are not external but form part of the institutions of patriarchy. The model should be tested in future research in:

- The constituencies in Punjab, which are driven by biradar,
- Anarchy in Taliban-controlled areas in Afghanistan,
- Bangladesh's madrassa belt,

Thus, evaluating portability in patriarchal formations of different nature.

4.5.7 Policy Implications -Layer-Specific Counter-Measures

KP-specific, costed blueprint (see Section 6) makes holes through each of the three layers:

- Structural - statutory 10 per cent GRB clause, accelerated DWO recruitment;
- Cultural - male-ally mobilisation, Alima counter-fatwa network;
- Intersectional: cellular VAWCs, travel allowances, ethnic caucuses.

Total cost 0.41 of provincial ADP -politically viable within current fiscal envelope.

4.5.8 Limitations and Forward Agenda

Embedded design Small-n embedded design constrained statistical generalisability; future waves should statistically test the triple-layer index of all 37 KP districts. Experimental pilots - random assignment of mobile VAWCs- would help separate the causal effect on the rates of case-filing of DV.6. Policy Implications – A KP-Specific, Costed Blueprint (Exact: 1,000 words).

4.5.9 Recommendations

4.5.9.1 Design logic Layer-Specific Counter-Measures

The triple-layer capture identified in Sections 4 -5 is immutable and inter-locking. Three scalable interventions that are mutually puncturing the structural, cultural and intersectional filters are suggested by us. Total 3-year cost PKR 1.45 billion (0.41 percent of average KP ADP) politically viable in current fiscal envelope and coalition acceptable (Table 13).

Table No 13: Cost-Benefit Summary (3-Year)

Intervention	PKR million	Global ROI Benchmark	KPI Target (2027)
Statutory GRB (10 %)	450	Rwanda: 1 → 4.3	95 % execution rate
Mobile VAWCs + stipends	200	South Africa: 1 → 3.8	15,000 women/year
Male-Alima network	300	Bangladesh: 1 → 2.6	500 k radio reach
Total	1,450	Weighted ROI: 1 → 3.7	Symbolic → Substantive

4.6 Structural Reform -Statutory Gender-Responsive Budgeting (GRB) Clause

Issue: Systemic 32 percent re-appropriation of gender-tagged schemes (Section 4A).

Solution: Addition of §9-B to KP Finance Act 2024-25 which requires 10% of each department budget to be gender-tagged with quarterly red-flag dashboards being published by Finance Department.

Price: PKR 450m (mini-GRB cells + audit software + training).

Financing: Revenue-neutral -0.13 percent of yearly ADP redistributed between the under-performing infrastructure heads.

Evidence Rwanda 10 percent GRB provided 61 percent female MP and 12 percent increase in allocations towards maternal-health (World Bank, 2022).

Introduction: Cross-party Finance Committee already in-principle upholds earmarking; JUI-F acquiescence won by positioning GRB as family welfare, rather than rights of women.

4.7 Cultural Reform Male-Ally and Alima Counter-Fatwa Network.

Issue: 47 fatwas (2013-22) refer to the fact that female politics are haram (Section 4B).

Solution:

- “Brothers for Equality” (B4E) 500 imams, teachers, youth leaders who have attended 2-day courses referencing Qur’anic precedents (Khadijah, Aisha);
- 50 certified Alimas send weekly FM-radio rebuttals and WhatsApp voice-fatwas.

Fee: PKR 300 m (honoraria + air time + curriculum design).

Funding: annual co-sponsorship to ADP and UN Women 0.08% of annual ADP+UN Women (PKR 75 m).

Evidence: The Alima Network in Bangladesh declined honour-based violence by 22 percent (World Bank, 2021).

Coalition Jamia Ashrafia jointly brands curriculum so that theology can be taken seriously and to evade criticism.

4.8 Intersectional Reform Mobile VAWCs + Travel Stipends.

Problem: mean 110km average distance to nearest VAWC merged districts (Section 4C).

Solution: 4 specially-adapted vans (PKR 35 m each), tele-counselling, legal services; PKR 2,000 travel allowances at the thumb of the woman only biometrically paid.

Cost: PKR 200 m (capital + 3-year O&M).

Funding: 0.06% on the annual ADP as well as World Bank IDA grant (PKR 50 m).

Evidence: Maternal mortality in South Africa reduced by 18% due to the mobile clinics (UN Women, 2021).

Protection: PIN on ATMs is given to female beneficiaries only, which circumvents the presence of male guardians.

4.9 Minority Caucus- Intersectional Voices Amplification.

Issue: Christian/Hindu women who are not part of mainstream women wings (Section 4C).

Solution: Statutory 5% of seats set aside to religious minorities women in the district party executives; PKR 10m/year campaign training funds and election escorts.

Cost: PKR 30 m (3-year pilot).

Funding: Party funds (PTI already leaves 0.5 percent to minority welfare; scale-up revenue-neutral).

4.10 Implementation Roadmap 36 months.

Table 14: summarizes rollout phasing:

Table No 14: Implementation Timeline & Milestones

Phase	Months	Key Milestones	Responsible Body
Phase-I	0-6	GRB clause tabled & passed	Finance Dept.
Phase-II	7-18	2 mobile VAWCs operational	Health Dept. + UN Women
Phase-III	19-30	B4E + Alima network launch	Religious Affairs
Phase-IV	31-36	Impact evaluation	PIDE + third-party auditor

Risk Matrix & Mitigation

Table 15 outlines layer-specific risks:

Table No 15: Risk Matrix & Mitigation

Risk	Likelihood	Mitigation	Responsible Actor
Fiscal cut-backs	Medium	Ring-fenced clause in Finance Act	Finance Dept.
Jirga backlash	High	Alima counter-fatwas + male allies	Jamia Ashrafia
Security threats	High	Police escort + hotline 1122	KP Police
Male ATM capture	Medium	Biometric PIN to woman only	NADRA

4.11 Monitoring -Outputs to Empowerment

KPI dashboards measuring every quarter will follow:

- GRB execution rate (target: 95 %)
- It can be achieved through mobile VAWC uptake (target: 15,000 women/year).
- Reach of fatwa rebuttal (target: 500 k radio listeners)

- -Third party auditing by Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PKR 3 m/year) is good to have credible evaluation.

4.12 Scale-Up Path Scale-Up Path KP to Frontier Region.

Successful pilot (6 districts) may be provincialized (26 districts) by incorporating costs in Finance Act. To be transferable to the madrassa belt of Afghanistan or the biradari belt of Punjab, it is necessary to calibrate the layers but not the blueprint replication.

5. Conclusion: Empirical, Theoretical and Policy Contributions

5.1 Empirical Take-away- Frozen Empowerment Quantified

This work aimed to clarify the reasons why two ideologically antagonistic parties, secular-nationalist ANP (2008-13) and Islamist-populist PTI (2013-23), provided only tokenized inclusion of women in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa regardless of the promise of progressive quota. In 36 counter-story interviews, 15-year budget micro-data and a 47-fatwa corpus, we added up the precise shortfall:

- 33% reserved-seat quota achieved = but 9 per cent of village councils are led by women (frozen since 2015).
- Domestic Violence Act was passed → but less than 10 percent of the estimated cases reported; zero cases in 7 tribal districts.
- Budget Gender-taggingre-appropriation 32% mid-year (male-coded budget) to security heads.

The message of the lesson by KP is clear: quotas without any layer-specific counter-measures result in spectral presence bodies but muted voices.

5.2 Theoretical Contribution Triple-layer Capture as travelling Model.

We combined feminist institutionalism and the intersectionality of decolonization to come up with the heuristic of the triple-layer capture:

1. Structural -fiscal re-appropriation, ghost DWO posts, male parliaments boards, biometric failure;
2. Cultural- fatwa corpus, jirga no-objection certificate, honour-based ATM patriarchy;
3. Intersectional -110-km distance of VAWC, landlessness, minority linguistic exclusion, Taliban roadblocks.

We theoretically show that symbolic incorporation is not a policy failure but a gendered equilibrium that is a result of inter-locking patriarchal infrastructures that assimilate and neutralize egalitarian rhetoric regardless of ideological wrapping. Patriarchal institutions are constitutive of cultural and intersectional penalties and not external.

The model goes to any frontier post-colony where:

1. Progressive rules exist along with traditional government,

2. Religious legal pluralism competes with the statutory law.
3. Fear is commodified infrastructural deficit.

5.3 Policy Contribution, Scalable, Costed, and Coalition-Friendly Blueprint.

We operationalized the triple-layer diagnosis into three costed interventions that are specific to KP:

1. GRB statutory clause of 10 percent - PKR 450 m (0.13 percent ADP) 95 percent execution rate target;
2. Mobile VAWCs + travel stipends PKR 200 m -15,000 women/year reach;
3. Male-Alima counter-fatwa network PKR 300 m 2 500 k radio listeners.

Total cost of 3 years: PKR 1.45 billion (0.41% ADP) - within manageable fiscal envelope and coalition-friendly (JUI-F co-brands religious legitimacy) Weighted ROI: 1 3.7 (World Bank standards).

5.4 Decolonial Reflexivity Decolonized Blueprint to Kairos

Weberian states are assumed in euro-centric quota blueprints; the post-colonial reality of KP, the frontier security vacuity, the Deobandi seminary domination, is making the universal prescriptions of Weberian states violent. Reforms in our blueprint, KP-ises, are:

- hybrid legitimacy - female alimas renegotiate the Qur'anic precedents instead of bringing in secular NGOs;
- layer-specificity - mobile vans are adjusted to geography of mountains, cash-plus-mobility can be used to compensate ATM-card patriarchy;
- coalition with customary structures - sensitising jirgas instead of destroying them.

The inability to localise reproduces colonial hierarchies that feminist scholarship aims to construct.

5.5 Forward Research Agenda -Portability Testing.

Embedded design Small-n limits statistical generalizability. Next steps:

- Quantitative test - develop Triple-Layer Capture Index (TLCI) on all 37 KP districts on the basis of the fiscal, GIS and fatwa data;
- Experimental pilot- randomized implementation of mobile VAWCs to determine causal effects on the rates of DV case-filing;
- Comparative growth- test TLCI in the biradari belt of Punjab, Taliban regions of Afghanistan, and Bangladesh madrasa-corridor to determine the portability over heterogeneous patriarchal clusters.

5.6 Normative Imperative -Beyond Visibility to Voice

The truth of the world which KP teaches is global: in patriarchal polities where quotas move but empowerment fails make a step backwards, i.e. layer-specific counter-measures are not the add-on or complementary care but the obligatory necessity. Women will always be spectral citizens; counted and not heard until cultural and intersectional penalties are erased and equal rights and opportunities are granted to women. Our roadmap provides a ladder - between visibility and voice - which we have to construct not in Brussels or Ottawa, but KP mountain passes.

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