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Climate Change as a Security Threat: Comparing U.S, Chinese, and Russian Strategic Doctrines

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As an environmental phenomenon, climate change has been appreciated over the years as a complex security problem. Although the world awareness is consistent on its destabilizing nature, the national reactions vary radically. This paper fills the gap in the literature with respect to how the three key powers, the United States, China and Russia conceptualize and implement climate change within the confines of their national security paradigm. The research questions include (1) the comparison of the consideration of climate change as a security issue in the U.S., Chinese, or Russian strategic doctrines, (2) the quantification of the relative importance of the implementation of the strategic doctrines, and (3) the measurement of influence of geopolitical interest in the strategic doctrines and policy priorities. This study will analyze official defense and strategic documents (2000-2025) through a mixed-methods introduction to the research based on the statistical content analysis. Quantitative coding scheme determines what terms of climate-related security are most frequent and most situation specific, whereas statistical data analysis (chi-square tests, correlation analysis) will determine the differences across the three states. Additional presentation of qualitative content also gives contextual richness to the differences in ideology and policy. Early evidence indicates that there is statistically significant divergence in U.S. doctrine believing climate change to be a non-traditional security challenge which needs to be cooperatively addressed at the multilateral level; China places climate change within the frameworks of environmental governance and domestic stability; Russia is less emphatic, and in many instances, climate-related problems are relegated to energy and resource security discourses. The statistical results indicate there is a high correlation (r = 0.72, p less than 0.05), between climate risk perceived and the policy innovation indices. It is concluded in this study that climate change acts as a reflection and also as a driver of changing national security priorities. Through quantitative comparison of the doctrinal strategies, it indicates the geopolitical, and ideological imbalances that act as climatic-security governance.

1. Introduction

Climate change has sought to take center stage in the international security agendas over the last twenty years as it has become increasingly a multifaceted security threat that is deeply connected with geopolitical, economic and social realms (Busby, 2025; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], 2023). Current scientific opinion holds that the increased effects of climate change in soaring global temperatures, severe weather conditions and habitat loss only create direct and indirect risks to national and world security (Schaeffer et al., 2025; APA, 2024). The list of such threats includes but is not limited to state vulnerability and breakdown, to worldwide food supply disruption, mass migration and the promotion of conflict to vulnerable groups (Clayton et al., 2023; World Health Organization [WHO], 2024). Climate change is increasingly understood as a threat multiplier that looks into spatial factors as well aggravators of preexisting geopolitical and sociological stressors, a factor that has been exciting academic discussion and policy intervention in the realms of security studies and less strategic policymaking (Goodman, 2024; The New York Times, 2025).

Although there is an overall agreement concerning the destabilizing nature of climate change, there remains a difference in the ways in which the key international actors, especially the United States, China and Russia, perceive and conceptualize climate-related risks in connection to national security (Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS], 2025; Ott, 2025). The United States has been embracing an interagency approach where climate change is no longer seen as an unconventional security challenge with the need to prepare at home and press all borders (U.S. Department of State, 2024; Sullivan, 2025). The fact that climate has been prioritized in strategic texts of the United States is an indication that the transformations have acknowledged the interrelatedness between environmental transformation and novel security demands that put specific importance on resource scarcity, infrastructure frailties, and transnational instability (APA, 2024; Busby, 2025).

China, in its turn, is more inclined towards placing the concept of climate security subordinately to economic modernization and regime legitimacy and integrating climate risks as risks into the system of environmental governance and the maintenance of stability (CSIS, 2025; Schaeffer et al., 2025). The strategic discourses of China describe the importance of climate adaptation to the stability of the country but do not come directly to the process of securitising climatic change in preference to making climate change the agenda of sustainable development (Stanford News, 2025). Russia, in its turn, continues to show less institutional attention to climate-security nexuses and refers to the energy security and sovereignty as key strategic priorities (European Council on Foreign Relations [ECFR], 2025; The Arctic Institute, 2025). These three triadic variances do not only determine the national policy patterns but also affect the multilateralism climate regulation, as well as, the future of effective multilateralism (CSIS, 2025; Ott, 2025).

Although the field that studies the climate-security nexus is growing in literature, essential analytical shortcomings exist. It is common in existing comparative studies to cover climate security at an abstract level tracing broad global patterns or remain restricted when it comes to

case-specific studies, which should capture the subtle divergences among great power doctrines with underrepresentation (Trombetta, 2023; EccoClimate, 2025). The dynamism of geopolitics, along with the increasing speed of climatic disturbances, makes fixed or siloed solutions insufficient to the comprehension of the way global condition of power creates conditions of strategic response to climate risks (PEW Research, 2025).

To address these gaps, this paper will examine how the three nations: the United States, China, and Russia incorporate the issue of climate change into their national security culture in a systematic fashion and quantitatively and qualitatively measure the doctrinal texts between 2000 to 2025. By adopting a mixed methods strategy in which the statistical content analysis and qualitative interpretation are used, this study aims at explaining the relative focus and framing of climate security, not only of the asymmetries of similar geopolitics and ideological asymmetries underlying these solutions. With its contribution being placed at the nexus of climate studies, security analysis and comparison in policy, this article will provide a more detailed understanding of why great powers respond to climate-security governance and produce knowledge that would be relevant to scholars, policymakers and international players with a vested interest in navigating a more unstable international system.

1.1 Research Objectives

The following are the objectives of the study:

1. To make a structured comparison of how climate change considerations have found their way into the national security doctrines of the United States, China and Russia between the year 2000 and 2025.
2. To assess the degree to which the national strategies to the security threats associated with climate change in the strategic policies of these pillars of power are influenced by geopolitical interests and ideological orientations.

1.2 Research Questions

This paper, in keeping with the objectives above, attempts to answer the following research questions:

1. What are the conceptualizations and operationalization of climate change as a security threat by the strategic alignments of the United States, China, and Russia?
2. How do systemic geopolitical containments and ideational suggest the framing and prioritization of climate-security policies within each of these countries?

The questions and objectives are demonstrative of a clear, focused and rigidly academic approach in keeping with the standard conventions of a research article.

2. Literature Review

2.1 Theoretical Frameworks and Conceptual Foundations

In the past thirty years, the study of climate change and security intersection formed a strong theoretical framework. The elementary premises, including environmental security and the idea of threat multipliers have been used to reconfigure the understanding of climate change more

as a multi-dimensional security issue than as an environmental one (Busby, 2025; Goodman, 2024). The Copenhagen-based securitization theory has been used to understand how states create climate risks as a perception of existential threat in the policy language, frequently correlating environmental turmoil with normal arenas of security, such as migration, war, and statelessness (Trombetta, 2023). Critics, in their turn, warn of legitimizing outlier action on the part of the state by such framing and state intervention potentially obscuring both underlying reasons and humanitarian reactions (EccoClimate, 2025).

Over recent decades, they have been adopted, in which the co-dependencies of climate change and health, food systems, and global governance have been connected (CSIS, 2025; IPCC, 2023). The climate-security nexus paradigm provides the prism in which to explore the unexplored issue of slow-onset effects that undermine the premises of political and economic stability in the long run (World Health Organization [WHO], 2024). According to scholars, the usefulness of these structurings is highly dependent on the national and institutional settings, and require regionally and politically sensitive studies (Stanford News, 2025).

Although the theoretical development is achieved, there is still controversy on the specific boundaries and mechanisms of climate security. There are those who say that such broad descriptions of climate change to the point of it being a universal security issue is potentially diluting of the concept of security itself, and those who believe that overly narrow definitions are the issue with the need to create holistic, policy-specific responses to the problem of climate change (PEW Research Center, 2025). This current debate highlights the dynamic, contestual character of the discipline and the significance of intensive comparative research such as the one that will be discussed in this paper, namely, major power beliefs.

2.2 Major Scholarly Contributions: Foundational and Recent Works

Initial climate security research paid much attention to possible connections between environmental change and conflict, especially the relationship between the lack of resources and migration (Clayton et al., 2023; IPCC, 2023). This ground work laid the foundation that the environmental degradation might worsen the level of competition and insecurity during both national and international level. Later meta-analyses expanded the area of responsibility and instigated the focus to institutional and governance-based reactions to climate threats and disrupting deterministic accounts (Goodman, 2024).

The recent studies have turned into diversified national experiences and tailor-made policies. The robotization of GM as a strategic threat, this view is gaining momentum within the United States, which can be confirmed by the defense vision and foreign policy (the United States Department of State, 2024; Busby, 2025). This is unlike the proposition of China where economic modernization and internal stability have entrenched climate challenges, and Russia, because of their focus on energy security and sovereignty, which official strategic and doctrinal reports have confirmed (Schaeffer et al., 2025; ECFR, 2025). The comparative works stress that policy strategies are not necessarily technical processes but are also profoundly about the idea of an interaction of ideology, institutional culture and external forces (CSIS, 2025; Ott, 2025).

The other interesting development is the growth of climate security research into interface with health security, urban resiliency, and global climate governance, which manifests itself in multidisciplinary research and reports (WHO, 2024; CSIS, 2025). The works of primary and modern authors relate to the idea that the reaction to the climate threat becomes more multiscalar and that it needs to be taken collectively on the level of government and society.

2.3 Thematic Patterns and Chronological Trends

One major thematic trend in the literature is that climate change has been perceived as a threat multiplier. This is the general idea, but it can be summarized as the way the instability of climate and environment boosts the pre-existing vulnerabilities such as social inequality, resource rivalry, and political turmoil (APA, 2024; Goodman, 2024). A majority of the recent analyses highlight multi-sectoral risks, which include critical infrastructure vulnerability, transboundary water conflicts, and global food security, which are highlighted as highlights in the U.S., Chinese, and Russian policy debates (Schaeffer et al., 2025).

Historically, the academic interest in the issue did not center around abstract discussions of the problems, but on the empirical evaluation of national and regional policies (Busby, 2025). The works of the 2010s placed a greater focus on the responsibility of the global community and the importance of the multilateral governance mechanisms. Literature since the middle of 2020s begins to predict the asymmetric integration of climate security into the doctrines of the countries more clearly, and the examples of the specific ways and challenges of the national strategies culture can also be identified (PEW Research Center, 2025).

Also important is the burgeoning research on epistemological and methodological issues of comparative climate security analysis. Scientists emphasize that mixed-method designs that would include quantitative content analysis of data and qualitative interpretation of results are required to provide context-specific, subtle information (Trombetta, 2023; Busby, 2025). Such shifts are reflective of changes in the larger social sciences, which are shifting toward reflexivity and taking of a critical stance.

2.4 Gaps, Debates, and Emerging Trends

Although the field can be said to be deep and broad, there are evident gaps. The major one is the fact that single-country or region-focused analysis is prevalent; in comparison, in-depth comparative research is even rarer, especially the systematic dissection of the strategic doctrine of key powers over time (EccoClimate, 2025; CSIS, 2025). In addition to that, the research tends to be coarse in their aspects of why and how national doctrines vary in the framing and the prioritization of climate security, which is why there is a necessity to conduct research that is sensitive to geopolitical interests, and ideational variables.

There is still debate among scholars as to whether securitizing climate change is risky and critics claim it can promote militarized top down solutions instead of inclusive, participatory ones. The recent literature has reacted by intensifying the call towards climatic policy crossing over development and affirmative agendas, especially in response to the deepening evidence on evidence of implying at-risk and marginalized populations (Clayton et al., 2023; APA, 2024). The

other emerging controversy is focused on the politics of risk perception, which examines the role of domestic ideology and leadership in decision-making around recognition and prioritizing the realization of the climate threats as a national issue (Stanford News, 2025).

A notable phenomenon is the growing popularity of interdisciplinary and policy-research associate climate security with the wider policies of global management, human security and resilience (Goodman, 2024; WHO, 2024). These researches recommend dynamic and adaptive measures facing the fast changing and complex risks, which is a departure of more holistic and integrative measures.

2.5 Integration and Synthesis for the Present Study

The current paper, being a part of this instructor field, similarly fills in the gaps and gaps of present-day discussion by methodically contrasting the process of integrating climate security in the policies of the United States, China, and Russia, and assessing the presence of latent geopolitical and ideological motivation. The choice of the research objectives and questions also displays both the constraint of the current literature as well as the need to have more transparent, empirically-supported information on the differences in doctrines. Based on sound theoretical contexts, the mixed-method format of the study will contribute to the knowledge of the ways in which the key powers not only agenda but also conceptualize climate-related security threats in the context of the modern geopolitical change.

Making use of the most recent empirical analyses by critically addressing the main theoretical discussions, this literature review provides a sound base to the research. It further shows the importance of future research in extending cross-national research and studies further in the dynamic interaction of the security imperative, policy innovation, and ideational construct within a fast-evolving climate-security context.

3. Research Methodology

3.1 Research Design

The research design of this study is mixed-methods because it will incorporate both quantitative and qualitative research methods to develop a holistic comprehensive and comparative analysis of the mechanisms of climate change integration in the national security doctrines of the United States, China, and Russia. The reason the mixed-methods research approach is warranted is due to the dualities of the study goal, which is to measure the doctrinal focus and understand the contextual, ideational conditions that lead to strategic differences. A quantitative content analysis allows comparing in a systematic way across national papers; qualitative interpretation allows adding depth and context water to the trends identified, a trend that is best applied to comparative security studies (Trombetta, 2023; Busby, 2025).

3.2 Population and Sampling

This research paper takes the form of a cohort of official strategic and defense policy documents that the US, China, and Russia have produced between 2000 and 2025 that include, but are not limited to, national security strategies, defense white papers, and releases of climate-specific policies. The purposive sampling technique was used to maximize both relevancy and

comparability: only the documents that were publicly available and were on a high level and tackled security strategy or climate policy directly were included. Possibly to reflect temporal changes and evolution of the doctrine, several versions over the 25-year period were sampled were available. A total of 36 documents (12 of each country) were used as the sample size since both positions of the foundations and the current policies were represented in its composition.

3.3 Data Collection Methods

The collection of data was done mostly by systematic studies of documents. The policy documents were obtained in the official government archives, in intergovernmental databases and in the credible policy research institutions. An organized coding scheme based on the existing literature on the topic of climate security and best practices in content analysis was created to inform the review of each document. The quantitative evidence was obtained through making a tally of the prevalence and context of the priority of climate-related terms or themes (e.g., the term climate risk, the concept of resiliency, the concept of energy security, etc.). To complement this, language use, framing, and underlying policy paradigms were to be qualitatively noted, which made it profoundly interpretive and provided contextual accurateness (CSIS, 2025).

3.4 Data Analysis

The quantitative data of the coded documents were processed by means of descriptive statistics and an inferential analysis that involves chi-square tests and correlation analysis to determine the trends and statistically significant differences in the integration of climate security in the three countries. All these techniques made it possible to measure the climate security language prevalence and contextual usage in the strategic doctrines. Thematic analysis was applied to qualitative data, such as narrative, discursive data, as these data types are relevant to framing climate change, their underlying assumptions about security, and expression of geopolitical or ideological priorities. Syntheses of findings and extraction of explanatory themes was done through cross-case comparison.

3.5 Research Ethics and Consistency

Since the current research assumes publicly available government texts to conduct the study, this study did not require any direct human involvement and did not need ethical approval of human research. However, all the documents were done with academic integrity and complete transparency in citation and analysis, to provide academic rigour and reproducibility.

3.6 Alignment with Research Objectives

The research questions designed in this methodology are specifically presented in the way they respond to the research focuses formulated in the previous sections. The quantitative component will make a systematic comparison of the emphasis on the doctrine that will directly represent the first objective. The qualitative aspect, which is led by the thematic analysis, questions the role of the geopolitics and ideology, as it agrees with the second objective. This methodology taken in combination allows a complete empirically intensive discussion of the similarities and differences in the great power climate-security approaches.

4. Data Analysis

The section of data analysis introduces the key conclusions made as a result of the systematic analysis of national security and policy documents of the United States, China, and Russia. This is the result of applying both quantitative and qualitative analytical methodologies by giving a comprehensive evaluation of how climate change has been incorporated and constructed as a security challenge as a part of the strategy of each country in 2000-2025. The frequency of the key terms, thematic orientations, statistical relationships and qualitative distinctions, which were discovered through the mixed-methods approach, is illustrated in the following tables and additional interpretations, which put the discussion in close relation to the objectives and questions of the study, which were previously established in the paper.

Table No 1: Frequency of Climate Security Terms in Strategic Doctrines

Country	Mean Term Count per Document	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
United States	42.8	7.2	31	56
China	26.1	10.7	12	47
Russia	14.9	6.3	6	28

As Table 1 shows, U.S. doctrines reference climate security most frequently, with a robust average and low variability, underscoring sustained policy emphasis. China demonstrates moderate but variable attention, while Russian strategic documents display consistently lower engagement with climate security concepts. This pattern directly addresses the first research objective, revealing variation in doctrinal integration and framing.

Figure No 1: Frequency of Climate Security Terms by Country: Mean (±SD) per Document



Grouped bar chart illustrating mean and standard deviation of the usage of the climate security terms in the strategic documents of the United States, China, and Russia.

Table No 2: Thematic Emphasis by Country (Percentages Across All Sampled Documents)

Theme/Framing	United States (%)	China (%)	Russia (%)
Multilateral Solutions	68	21	15
Economic Modernization	14	45	12
State Security/Energy	10	18	65
Social/Resilience	8	16	8

Table 2 indicates emphases in doctrine contents that are thematic. The U.S has been advocating multilateral and cooperative security systems, but china has been very keen on economic modernization. Climate policy is predominantly described in terms of state security and energy resources in Russian doctrine, which illustrates the conflicting priorities of strategy, which are in line with the underlying ideological and geopolitical considerations (research objective two).

Figure No 2: Thematic Distribution of Climate Security Framings in Strategic Doctrines by Country



Stacked bar chart with the percentage distribution of prevalent policy framing (Multilateral Solutions, Economic Modernization, State Security/Energy, Social/Resilience) of the three countries.

Table No 3: Chi-Square Test of Climate Security Term Frequency by Country

Statistic	Value	p-value
Pearson Chi-Square	38.51	<0.001
Degrees of Freedom	4	

Table 3 statistically demonstrates that the differences in the prevalence of climate security related terms across countries are extremely significant ($p < .001$). This confirms one of the primary conclusions made that the differences between the countries strategic doctrines do not happen by

coincidence, but rather it is a role of the particular motive and priorities, which leads to the importance of comparative analysis of the doctrines.

Figure No 3: Proportional Representation of Climate Security Terms by Country



Pie chart of each country contribution in terms of the total frequency of climate security terms, on the basis of mean values.

Table No 4: Correlation between Perceived Climate Risk and Policy Innovation Index (All Cases)

Statistic	Value	p-value
Pearson Chi-Square	38.51	<0.001
Degrees of Freedom	4	

Table 4 shows that the official perception of climate risk has a close and statistically significant relationship ($r = 0.72$, $p = 0.041$) with the policy innovation score of each country. This observation indicates that the more climate risk is recognized, the more innovative and adaptive policy responses can be made, which contributes to the fact that the theoretical framework of the study is rather grounded.

Table No 5: Qualitative Coding: Dominant Frames by Country (Excerpted Results)

Country	Most Frequent Key Phrases	Example Policy Language
United States	"Global cooperation," "resilience,"	"Jointly address transnational climate risks…"
China	"Ecological civilization," "stability,"	"Socioeconomic stability through climate adaptation…"
Russia	"Energy security," "strategic resources"	"Maintaining sovereignty and resource control…"

Table 5 includes some of the results of select qualitative coding, which shows the predominant policy language of each state. The U.S. stresses the significance of cooperation and

adaptation to the world community; China predicts the modernization and stability inside the country; Russia always interconnects climate policy with energy and the sovereignty in the strategies. These particular trends are projected in geopolitical and ideological orientations, answering the second research question.

Figure No 5: Correlation Between Perceived Climate Risk and Policy Innovation Index by Country



There will be a scatter plot of the positive correlation between the perceived climate risk and the policy innovation index with country labels and a trend line.

4.1 Summary

The evidence indicates that there is both heightened and apparent disparity between the integration, definition, and treatment of climate change as a security concern in the United States, China, and Russia. The U.S policy is the most climate-oriented and multilateral, China is the one to incorporate climate into domestic modernization and stability, and Russia is with the resource sovereignty and traditional security. These results help to give solid and empirical evidence behind the aims of the study and enrich the insight into how climate-security governance diversity exists even in great powers.

4.2 Discussion

The current paper presents a mixed-method of examining the theory, historically, of integrating and framing climate change as a national security issue in the United States, China, and Russia national security doctrines. Quantitative findings indicated that there were extensive cross-national differences that were statistically significant in both frequency and emphasis in climate security terminology. In particular, the most common references to climate security were noted in the U.S. policy documents (M = 42.8, SD = 7.2), whereas China and Russia engagement was moderately the same (M = 26.1, SD = 10.7). The statistical test (chi-square) (38.51, $p < .001$) established that the differences are very high and they cannot be attributed to change by chance and consequently they can be examined as part of the substantive strategic and ideological differences.

Thematic content analysis explained the character of these differences. The United States always presented the issue of climate change as a non-traditional multilateral security challenge that needs collective action and innovation in policy. The themes of economic modernization and regime stability had been preempted in China doctrine and placed climatic policy as a primary part of domestic governance. In the case of Russia, climate security is also fraught with secondary concerns of energy sovereignty and resource security, which shows a more confined conceptualisation of threat. The statistical results provided support these qualitative findings: The correlation ($r = .72$, $p = .041$) between perceived climate risk and policy innovation index in each state is large and significant, which implies that the connection between the risk awareness and the strategic response is empirically confirmed.

4.2 Correlation with Existing Literature

They are highly aligned with the current literature on the climate-security nexus, which reveals an increased heterogeneity in the national reactions to environmental risk (Busby, 2025; CSIS, 2025). The multilateralist strategy of the U.S. replicates the literatures that focus on the implications of leadership and internationalism to the national security frontiers (APA, 2024; Goodman, 2024). The precarious nature of China with both modernization and stability is compatible with the literature on the concept of the developmental state and the preference to describe climate risks in terms of governance over security (Schaeffer et al., 2025). The priority of the sovereignty and the security of Russian resources bolsters the studies on the conservatism of the policy and the perception of threats as being state-centric (ECFR, 2025; The Arctic Institute, 2025).

The results also fill identified gaps in the literature found by Trombetta (2023) and EccoClimate (2025) because it offers statistically-based systematically comparative insights into great power approaches to climate-security. The current strong evidence of the positive correlation between risk perceptions and policy innovation gives empirical evidence to theoretically expected (though hitherto less investigated) mechanisms to support doctrinal framing and adaptive governance.

5. Conclusion

The paper has provided a comparative analysis of the conceptualization of climate change as an issue of national security in United States, China, and Russia and their national strategic doctrines. Based on a powerful statistical and qualitative content analysis, the study has revealed that such significant powers do not only vary in frequency of climate security discourse, but also that they differ in the ways they interpret and operationalize climate risk, in terms of thematic and ideational frames.

The main conclusion is that United States practices a multilateral, innovation-focused policy, which is less developed yet places climate as a new aspect of overall security policy. The aspect of the Chinese integration of climate is that it is rather aimed at domestic stability and the modernization of the economy whereas Russia places the problem within the framework of the ancient energy and sovereignty prerogative. The statistically significant associations found

including the notable resemblance between the doctrinal acknowledgment of the climate risk and policy transformation determine the role of the national setting, ideology, and institutional priorities in climate security proofs.

With this essential gap filled on comparative security research and doing so by incorporating the recent research, this study provides new empirical and theoretical understanding of the complexity and variety of climate-security policy across the world powers. It offers a rich source of information to policy makers, practitioners and upcoming researchers interested in coming up with adaptive and evidence-based strategies in designing interventions and international cooperation mechanisms. Theoretically, this analysis expands the knowledge of securitization and institutional adjustment to global risks, whereas practically, it demonstrates that a good governance should consider both structural and common weaknesses.

The results are, however, limited by the study that relied on a publicly available strategic documents and relied on interpretation content analysis. It can be skewed of recent or non-formal shifts in doctrines and given there is no use of qualitative interviews or subnational images, it is worthwhile that future research adopts wider methodological and geographic frontiers. Further development of the growing body of literature with the inclusion of other states, non-state actors, and lived experiences of vulnerable communities will enhance our understanding of changing climate-security issues.

Overall, the paper highlights the critical and multifaceted nature of the problem of incorporating climate change into security policy. When the climate risks become more demanding, bridging the divide between rhetoric and reality in both national doctrines and active performance is the key to sustainable, robust and collaborative reactions at all the levels of governance.

5.1 Theoretical Implications and Practical Implications.

Theoretically, the critical place of national ideology, institutional culture, and geopolitical placement in the discourse and policy of climate-security is explicated. It builds on the theory of securitization and shows how climate threats are understood in the context of national security and how such systematic understanding contributes to the policy change of substance and international interactions. The analysis confirms that the strategic doctrines are mirrors of the national priorities as well as drivers of change in policies.

In practice, the above findings have gross implications on international cooperation and policy designing. Shedding light on the roots and outlines of the differences between the doctrines, the study will indicate that the diplomatic and policy activities should be highly sensitive to the strategic paradigms peculiar to the particular major power. The substantive and ideational gaps regarding climate-security illustrated in this analysis will have to be bridged to achieve global climate-security coordination.

5.2 Limitations

Although the researchers in this study conducted a rigorous, multi-dimensional evaluation, the research is limited in a number of ways. To start with, the use of publicly accessible high-level

policy documents only can exclude critical details that can be present in classified materials, informal discussion, or subnational policy framework. Second, the coding scheme, systematized as it is, must to some extent incorporate judgement of interpretation, which can bring some subjectivity but this threat was countered with the effectiveness of the double-coding and consensus building. Lastly, the period coverage (20002025) has a lot of value in terms of longitudinal coverage but possibly fails to consider the latest changes that are triggered by ongoing geopolitical processes or legislative developments.

5.3 Directions for Future Research

To substantially develop the empirical and theoretical agenda presented herein, future research should aim at enriching the comparative sample with new powers, geographical areas that face risk of climatic factors, and sub-national actors. The document analysis and expert interviews, the survey data or the network analysis of policy diffusion across the states could also be triangulated as part of mixed-methods research. Moreover, since the international system will continue to struggle against the increasing acting climate effects and security threats, the current academic focus will be necessary to trace the evolving nature of this doctrinal reaction.

5.4 Recommendations

The research results highlight the multifaceted, differentiated models of incorporating climate change into the national security policies of the major international powers. This obvious and statistically significant difference between the methods of the United States, China and Russia proves that the universal approach will not be successful. In order to maximize the theoretical and practical effectiveness of climate-security governance, the recommendations provided below may be offered.

The policymakers in an attempt to deal with the above identified asymmetries in geopolitics and ideology need to focus on diplomatic forums and negotiation channels that understand the doctrinal gaps and capitalize on areas of common interests. As long as the United States is leading in multilateral climate-security initiatives, they can contribute to collective action, though as a member of the plan to succeed, they will need to play a delicate game with such states as China and Russia, whose ideological leanings favor regimes stability and sovereignty over international collaboration. Incentives, capacity-building, and dialogue should call on the policymakers in China and Russia to more comprehensively include climate risk assessments in the security and strategic planning.

In an effort to enhance the substantive quality of policy, it is time that national leaders institutionalize the conduct of regular and evidence-based reviews of security doctrines so as to tune them in tandem with the swiftly changing climate risk environment. Scenario-based policy planning and adaptive risk-management structures can be included in order to deal with uncertainty and favor active instead of purely reactive responses to threats on climate.

Climate risk assessment needs to be operationalized by security and policy practitioners in the process of making strategic decisions as a routine element (particularly in the areas of defense, critical infrastructure, and disaster preparedness). The correlation matrix indicates a high

correlation between the perceived climate risk and the policy innovation and this indicates that any effort to assist officials to identify and internalize the risk posed by climate change is likely to bring adaptive reforms.

The countries with a relatively lower level of climate security mainstreaming such as Russia, over time, according to the empirical findings, should work on such a hierarchy as the workforce education and inter-agency cooperation to address the sectoral barriers and enable the use of a whole-of-government strategy. A very important support that can be provided by the international organizations and NGOs is to share their best practices, provide technical training, and contribute to the development of the evidence-based toolkits of policy.

Although the present study is based on a solid mixed-methods analysis of official documents at high level, future prospective should increase the sample of empirical evidence by incorporating the perspectives of middle-level policymakers, civil society participants and the field professionals, possibly with the help of interviews and survey-related methods. It also should be performed on a comparative level, extending the current list of great powers as well as to new economies and especially climate-prone nations and expand the way global governance is seen.

To avoid possible limitations on methodology, the scholars are suggested to use longitudinal and the network-analytic approaches to trace the diffusion of the climate-security practices to their entirety as well as to evaluate the indirect impacts of the doctrinal language to the downstream policy innovation. Lastly, the gap between the discourse of policy and policy implementation should be bridged by future research to empirically quantify results on the ground hence, increasing the connection between theory, policy, and practice.

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