

Understanding of Hybrid Political System of Islamic Republic Iran: The Case Study of General Election 2024

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The Islamic Republic of Iran possesses a hybrid political system. It encompasses both elements of democracy and Islamic theocracy. As a unique model of the Islamic governmental system, the political system in Iran rests on dual sources of legitimacy. The objective of this paper is to examine the voter behaviour and the result of the 2024 elections in the Islamic Republic of Iran as well as to study the impact of president death on the election schedule. This election recorded the lowest turnout in history. The voter behaviour, attitude, and concerns towards Iranian politics and electoral politics also studied. The factors that cause low turnout is also discussed. The data for conducting this research is collected from journals, articles, official websites, and other secondary sources. The study concluded that the hope of no political and social change in Iran exploits the voters and that's the main reason of low turnout in elections 2024. This study recommends that Iran's government should focus to make electoral process modern, and policies should be flexible.

1. Introduction

Iran has been a unique Islamic political model since the successful emergence of the Islamic Revolution in 1979, which was led by Rohullah Khomeini (Daneshgar, 2020). Iranian government based on the theory of the Islamic Persian philosopher Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini (Ismael & Ismael, 2023). He was a revolutionary, spiritual, and religious leader inside Iran as well as outside of Iran, people of other nation also followed him because he was the spiritual and Islamic leader of Islamic world. He was marja-e-taqleed (an Islamic point of Shia Islamic ideology). His political theory brought about a revolution in Iran in 1979. This is the turning point of history and an unbelievable revolution for the big powers in the world who have great influence (Goldstone et al., 2022). Still, the Iranian revolution is not digestible for rival Iranian states (Figuroa, 2022). The theory that was the main cause of the revolution was "Theory of Vilyat-e-Faqih" (also spelled Walayat-e- Faqih). It means the government of jurists. This theory gained great significance in the subject of Muslim political philosophy, especially in modern times. All the setup of government, its structure, and division of power were decided by the Khomeini which was implemented after the emergence of the revolution (Mohammadzadeh et al., 2022). Still, the Iranian government now follows that structure and setup with some changes.

The fact that makes the Iranian political system unique as compared to other Islamic governments in the world is that only highly qualified persons are eligible to join the politics of Iran—persons like Islamic Scholars and Islamic Philosophers also known as mullahs and clergy (Kostiuk, 2023). The persons who want to join politics should have higher education in Islamic law, Islamic jurisprudence, Shariah studies, Civil laws, etc (Djawas et al., 2022). Ayatullah is the higher rank in Islamic qualifications. Islamic Republic Iran is a state with a hybrid political system (Moheimany & Najafinejad, 2020). It consists of Islamic theocracy and democratic characteristics (Humairah & Syamsuddin, 2024). All political power is vested in the supreme leader while the president is the second political head and representer of the state (Figuroa, 2022). The supreme leader is the political & Islamic leader of the state as well as, and he also has control of the foreign, and economic affairs of the state (Djawas et al., 2022). Moreover, he has command of the defence force. Iran has a special armed force system. These forces play their role inside and outside Iran. The IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guards Croups) is the third layer of the Iranian defence force (Alemzadeh, 2023). Although they have a strong army, they have branches like air and navy (Leila Namdarian, 2024). The democratic value secured by the election in Iran. The electoral system of Iran consists of three layers. The people of Iran are free to choose the members of parliament, the assembly of experts, and the president. Following are the objectives and research questions of Study

1.1 Research Objectives

- To study the electoral process of hybrid political system of Iran.

- To analyse the result of general election of Islamic Republic Iran.
- To study the causes of low turn-out in elections.
- To study the current changes in presidential election schedule after President's (Ibrahim Raisi) martyrdom.

1.2 Research Question

1. Why the election of 2024 had much significance for Iranian politics?
2. Why have elections recorded the lowest turnout since the revolution?

2. Literature Review

Kinzer provided the brief study of Islamic Republic Iran in political manner. This book deals with the study of Iranian political dynamics, specifically. The author mentioned the comprehensive details about that state. Iran's strategic, economic and Islamic perspectives also defined. The author gives a look of before the revolution of 1979 in Iran which is regarded as the Islamic revolution of Iran (the turning point of history). He provides the concise detail about the historical background of Iran including the era of Persia (now Iran), Cyrus the great (2000 years of ancient history). The era of Iran-Iraq war, Islamic revolution discussed briefly (Kinzer, 2006). The author mentioned the political dynamics in Iranian political history by highlighting the president of Iran but he didn't write about the electoral process even about presidential or parliamentary election process. The research aims to fulfill the gap by writing the detail about the electoral method of Islamic Republic Iran.

Alem (2011) mentioned the study of the electoral process of Iran deeply. The historical background briefly mentioned. The author also wrote detail about the legislative framework and election management bodies. The parliamentary elections and the presidential elections also mentioned. She discussed the political factions in Islamic Republic Iran (Alem, 2011). Although this book is a good and satisfying source of study to get knowledge about the Iranian electoral system, but the author didn't mention any recommendations and guidance to make the electoral system better. She also ignores the factor of modernity in Iranian electoral process. The aim of research to provide the recommendations for the Iranian electoral system to make it modern.

Osiewicz (2021) give detail about the framework of Iranian Islamic Republic after the emergence of Islamic Revolution in 1979. Mainly he highlighted the theory of vilayat-e-Faqih on which Iranian government structure is still operating. It is that theory which was presented by Ayatullah Khomeini and was the main cause of revolution in Iran (Osiewicz, 2021). This is brief study but the author didn't write about the electoral process. The research aim to fulfil this gap by writing the detail about the election process in Iran after the revolution.

Abazari and Bahrami (2023) provided the study about the election method in Islamic Republic of Iran. The role of public, their interest in politics also mentioned in this piece of

study. According to writer many people of Iran have no interest in political affairs. It is because of lack of political knowledge and mainly the influence of conservatism party ruling. It is descriptive analytical study of the method of election. The voter attitude towards the electoral process, the factors that influencing their mind and decision also mentioned (Abzari & Bahrami, 2023). The writers discussed descriptively election process in Iran, but this study lack the recommendations for

Iranian's electoral process for the adjustment and survival in modern time. Modern tools, tactics and strategies missed by the writers. The research aims to fulfill this gap by mentioning the modern strategies which can be possible to apply on reality basis.

Hafezi (2024) provides analytical study of parliamentary election result of Islamic Republic Iran. He mentioned the reasons of low turn-out in parliamentary elections of 2024. The election was the first after the anti-government demonstrations of 2022–2023, which descended into one of the greatest political unrests in Iran since the Islamic revolution before being violently put down with widespread arrests and even deaths. The race is primarily between conservatives and neo- conservatives who are all allegiance to revolutionary ideas but with the establishment of moderates and reformists accusing the election of being rigged and unjust (Hafezi, 2024). The writer gives the satisfying analytical study of general elections 2024 but he didn't mention the election method, process and its phases. The research aims to fulfill this gap by providing the study about the election process and its phases.

3. Research Methodology

Qualitative method is the methodological approach for investigating the research problem of the paper. The data for conducting this research gathered from the secondary sources such as books, journals, articles, news papers, official reports and official internet websites. The Iranian official sources are used for the statistic of results for the interpretation and analysis of the election results. For finding the causes of low turn-out, the official sources of Iran as well as the articles of western writers are used to study in comparative manner to reach the actual reasons and to find the true conclusion. Mainly, this research is conducting to analyze deeply the current status of general elections and for the predictions of outcomes on Islamic Republic Iran.

4. Results


4.1 Political System of Islamic Republic Iran (a look after Islamic Revolution 1979)

Iran's political structure is neither fully democratic nor theocratic. Its guiding principle, known as guardianship of the jurist, was created by former Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini (CFR-Editors, 2022). Iran's ordinances and laws must be founded on Islamic doctrine, as defined by the December 1979 constitution and its modification in 1989. Iran is defined as the Islamic Republic with a political structure based on Shia Islam. In these conditions, the Supreme Leader (Ayatollah) and clerics who oversee all significant governmental functions exercise intellectual and political authority over a political system. Iran's political system is special and complicated, as evidenced by the way it combines powerful, unelected institutions under the control of the Supreme Leader with elected officials like the President and members of the

Parliament, formally known as the Consultative Islamic Assembly, or Majlis (Parkhomchik, 2020).

Figure No 1: Iran’s Regime Structure

Iran’s Regime Structure



Source: Fatemeh Aman and Alex Vatanka, Middle East Institute.

COUNCIL on FOREIGN RELATIONS

Thus, as previously said, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the leader of the Iranian Revolution who followed Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini upon his death in 1989, holds the highest position in the Iranian power structure. Since the Islamic Republic was established in 1979, only two men have held the position: Khomeini and Khamenei. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has the authority to nominate and remove the leaders of many powerful institutions in the military, government, judiciary, and supreme commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. This is because the Supreme Leader determines Iran's primary foreign and domestic policy. Additionally, he selects half of the members of the Council of Guardians, a conservative group made up of six clerics and six legal experts who decide whether candidates are eligible to run for public office by vetting them for their adherence to Islam, their belief in the Velayat-e Faqih, and their understanding of the foundations of the Iranian Revolution.

The second-highest-ranked official in the nation is the President, who is elected to a four-year term. As the leader of the executive branch, he is in charge of making sure the Constitution


is followed. Although the President serves as the public face of the Iranian government, he also assists in directing economic and social initiatives and represents Iran in numerous foreign opportunities.

The President is supported by a Cabinet consisting of eighteen ministers and ten vice presidents. The 290 members of Iran's Majlis, a unicameral legislature, are chosen for four-year terms. It seems that the Majlis perform duties that are comparable to those of a regular parliament. Legislators create laws, accede to international agreements, and approve the national budget. The Majlis has the authority to call ministers or the President to account and impeach them. Nevertheless, the conservative Guardian Council must ratify every Majlis law. In addition, the Guardian Council verifies the eligibility of presidential and legislative candidates. The Expediency Council, which advises the Supreme Leader on both internal and external matters, is composed of high-ranking government officials, including the President, the Speaker of the Majlis, and the head of the judiciary. The 39-seat administrative body's additional members are chosen by the Supreme Leader. The appointment of half of the Assembly of Experts' members is another authority vested in the Supreme Leader. Every eight years, the remaining fifty percent of the 86-seat Assembly is chosen directly by the electorate. The Supreme Leader may be removed by the Assembly of Experts if they believe he is corrupt or unable to carry out his duties. The President and the Supreme Leader share obligations and duties within the executive branch. As legislative bodies, the Majlis and the Guardian Council have comparable duties. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and the regular army make up the armed forces, and there is a special court in the judiciary that handles matters involving clerics (Parkhomchik, 2020).

Figure No 2: Power Blocs That Shape Decisions in Iran

Power blocs that shape decisions in Iran

including key representative figures




Source: ECFR; June 2020

(source: ECFR, June 2020)

4.2 Electoral Process

Iran has hybrid political system which is the combination of Islamic theocracy and democratic values. The democratic values is followed by the elections in Iran. The right to choose the government officials are the symbol of freedom and liberty that is secured by the democratic theories. Although in Iran, there is no good democratic development. Its legislature consists on two bodies, the one is unicameral “parliament” which is consist on 290 members and the second but the more powerful body is the ‘Guardian of Council’. In Iran there is a great dominance of conservative ruling authorities, that’s why the Iranian political system is also known as the “Mullahcracy”, which means the government of mullahas (Islamic Jurists). The electoral system of Iran consists on four levels, The first one is to elect the supreme leader. The second one is to elect the president. The third one is to elect the 88 members of assembly of experts. The fourth one is to elect the 290 members of parliament.

Figure No 3: Elected and Unelected Insitution



(Source: BBC News, 2020)

The main power of state is 'supreme leader' which is elected by the assembly of experts and the members of assembly of experts are elected by public. The second political head of the state is president, which is elected by the public through voting. The third level of Iranian elections are to elect the members of assembly of experts. The fourth level of elections is parliamentary elections.

So, Iran's elections consist on four level. The most significant level of Iranian elections is the first level (to elect the supreme leader). According to Iranian law the supreme leader of Iran should be mujtahid (Islamic Scholar). The second important levels are the second and fourth level, which is popular in Iran. The presidential elections and the parliamentary elections.

The two other important houses of Islamic Republic Iran is Guardian of Council and Expediency Council. The members of Guardian of council consists on six members. It have three lawyers and three Islamic Scholars, which are directly appointed by the Supreme Leader after every six year. The members of Council of Expediency also elected by supreme leader after every five year. The council of expediency made by Khomeini in 1984, when the first case of rejection of labor bill by the guardian of council but it was accepted by the consultative parliament. To resolve such cases between the Guardian of council and the Parliament the expediency council established. In 1984 it consisted on 13 members but now it consists on 50 members (Davar, 2019).



4.3 General Elections 2024

The country's minister of interior announced on Monday that the turnout in Iran's parliamentary election was approximately 41%, the lowest since the Islamic revolution of 1979 that toppled the country's clerical authorities. The worsening economic conditions and a lack of electoral choices available to a largely youthful populace fed up with social and political constraints, Friday's election was viewed as a litmus test for the legitimacy of the clerical establishment (Hafezi, 2024).

It is not appropriate to see Iran's March 1st parliamentary and Assembly of Experts elections as a democratic process in which voters cast their ballots. Elections in Iran, like in many other regimes, have traditionally been utilized as a justification for the authority and influence of the ruling class. One year has passed since Mahsa Jina Amini tragically died at the hands of Iran's morality police for wearing an inappropriate veil; this incident provoked a nationwide uprising that lasted for a span of one month. They also coincide with severe repression by the government, worsening financial conditions, and an increase in actions. The political establishment, headed by the ailing 85-year-old Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, has prioritized a further concentration of conservative control across elected and unelected institutions to make way for clerical succession, instead of restoring popular legitimacy through inclusive elections. Unsurprisingly, radical conservatives won both institutions in these elections, with the lowest voter turnout in 45 years. Only 41% of eligible voters cast ballots, despite calls for a boycott from women's advocates such 2023 Nobel Prize candidate Narges Mohammadi and even some domestic reformist politicians like former President Muhammad Khatami (who himself did not cast a ballot). The percentage of voters in the Tehran province was roughly 24%, which is a record low. These figures indicate decreasing public support for the Iranian state's legitimacy (Vakil, 2024). The Islamic Republic came well short of fulfilling international requirements for elections; however, the election represents a genuinely democratic attempt (Maloney, 2013).

Iran conducted its twelfth parliamentary election since the revolution of 1979 on March 1. It also held its sixth election for the Assembly of Experts, the clerical body that is supposedly in charge of choosing the country's next supreme leader. Iran's national polls saw record low turnout, the third consecutive election in which the majority of voters boycotted. Conservatives strengthened their control over the institutions of the Islamic Republic concurrently. The two patterns show how the state and society are becoming more and more apart. An indication of the general dissatisfaction with the system and uncertainty that voting can bring about a shift in politics (International-crisis-group, 2024).

The Iranian dominant regime faction, referred as the "conservatives" and "principilists" are still gained momentum of their dominance in the parliamentary elections 2024. These factions are strongly supported by the government of Iran because they are loyal to the supreme

leader as well as support the revolutionary policies. The IRGC and khamnei (supreme leader) is the power center in Islamic Republic Iran.

Some supporters of the Jebhe Paydari (Perseverance Front), a Conservative faction, have been so fervently supportive of the Islamic regime that they are referred to as "super-revolutionaries." Since its founding in 2011, the Paydari has generated controversy in Iran's political situation, and they have been blamed for a number of significant political events that have occurred there in the last ten years. They now stand a good chance of winning the majority of seats in the parliament ahead of the parliamentary elections, which worries moderates in Iran as well as some Principlist movement supporters in second phase of election. A particularly radical element in Iranian politics has come under increasing criticism in the run-up to the election, but its standing as the embodiment of the new Iran appears stronger than ever (Hashemi, 2024). The current situation and result of election reflects the shifting dynamics inside Iran's political landscape.

4.4 Significance of Iranian Elections of 2024 in Region

The Iranian election 2024 had great significance because after every eight years the members of assembly of experts elected by the public of Iran. After the election of Assembly of experts, the elected members have to choose their next supreme leader. The supreme leader is the most important figure of Iran as well as the centre of power in state. In 2024, the next supreme leader was elected in the first phase of election. The supreme leader has control on foreign policies and foreign relations. In middle east Iran involved in many proxy wars. With the change of supreme leader, the foreign policy of Iran will also change, the strategy to expand the ideology of revolution, the techniques of proxy war also change. That's why the election of 2024 was very important for the great powers and especially for the region of middle east.

After the results, the members of assembly of experts choose Ali Khamenei as next supreme leader for Iran (who is already serving as supreme leader in Iran). So, now there is no chance of any kind of change in political, domestic, war, and international policies.

4.5 Analysis of Results


Voting for Iran's 12th parliament and sixth Assembly of Experts ended at 12:00 a.m. Saturday local time after 16 straight hours (IRNA, 2024). The voting began at 8:00 a.m. Friday local time at 59,000 polling stations across the country, with more than 15,000 candidates competing for 290 seats in the Iranian parliament, and 144 candidates vying for positions at the eight-year-term Assembly of Experts, an 88-member body that oversees the activities of Iran's supreme leader, and is empowered to designate and dismiss the supreme leader. A total of 61.17 million people, comprising 30.94 million men and 30.22 million women, were eligible to vote in the two elections. The voting was initially scheduled to end at 6:00 p.m. local time, but was extended three times, with each extension lasting for a two-hour period.

Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei cast his vote at a polling station in the Iranian capital Tehran immediately after the voting began (English-News, 2024).

The elections of 2024 interpreted as the shift in political landscape of Iran or shift in Iranian politics because of the clash between conservatives and liberals. The result of 2024 parliamentary election by official sources of Islamic Republic Iran showed the turnout was about 41%. It is the lowest turnout in Iranian history since 1979.


4.6 Results of Parliamentary Elections

Figure No 4: Results of Parliamentary Elections



(Source: Iran Primer, 2024)

Figure No 5: Results of Parliamentary Elections



(Source: Iran Primer, 2024)

Iranians chose to hold 245 out of 290 seats in the first round of voting. To determine who will win the final 45 seats, a second round of voting is planned for April or May.

48 independents

138 conservatives

23 neo-conservatives

25 reformists

Eleven-females

Extremists enjoyed two significant benefits in the voting. Initially, the influential Guardian Council decreased the number of candidates by excluding almost all well-known centrists and reformists from both elections. Second, a large number of political activists and reformers abstained from voting. In comparison to the last election, Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, who served as parliamentary speaker from 2020 to 2024, failed to perform well. He got 1.26 million votes in 2020, which was higher than any other contender for Tehran's 30 seats. However, in 2024, with just 447,905 votes, he finished in fourth place. The Paydari Front's hardline candidates, Seyyed Mahmoud Nabavian (597,770 votes), Amir Hossein Sabeti (487,982 votes), and Hamid Rasayei (485,711), received more votes than Qalibaf, a mainstream or traditional conservative (Iran-data-portal, 2024). A "return of principlists and alienation associated with conventional conservatives" appeared in the outcomes (Nada, 2024).

4.7 Result of Assembly of Expert

The election of the Assembly of Experts was similarly dominated by hardliners. In the event that event decided the next supreme leader. 53 of the 88 intellectuals and clergy were in their positions. That clergies choose Ayatullah Ali Khamenei as the next supreme leader of Iran (Iran-data-portal, 2024).

Ayatollah Mohsen Qomi and Ayatollah Alireza Arafī, who have both had close relationships with Supreme Leader Khamenei, were the two nominees who received the most votes. Prominent centrists and reformers were excluded from consideration by the Guardian Council in 2024, which screens all candidates. The Iran Primer was informed by Kourosh Ziabari, an Iranian journalist at Columbia University, that the assembly "has been purged of the most centrist supporters of logic." Particularly, after serving on the Guardian Council for 24 years, former President Rouhani was disqualified. Additionally, it disapproved of IRGC intelligence chief Hossein Taeb, previous intelligence minister Mahmoud Alavi, and former intelligence minister Heydar Moslehi (Nada, 2024).

4.8 Causes of Low Turn Out

4.8.1 Political Cause

The absence of a strong people popular political party in Iran is one of the main causes of lower development of public interest in political affairs. Many people of Iran are not satisfied with the dominance of the conservative party, especially, with their economic policies. The wing of liberal reformists is mainly opposed to the conservative government that is the ruling body in Iran. This situation creates political chaos which leads to serious political problems. The members of 'Guardian of Council' have constitutional right to make the list of nominated candidates. The candidates from liberals, moderates and reformers mostly rejected by the members of guardian of council. The fundamentalists, conservatives and revolutionists seemed

liberals, moderates and reformers as threat for the preservation of Islamic Revolutionary values and norms in Islamic Republic Iran.

That's why mostly other 's party candidates rejected by guardian of council. As guardian of council consists on senior clergies. The lack of powerful individuals who support reforming groups or who are more independent indicates that there isn't a lot of resistance to Mojtaba's nomination in the assembly. The absence of opposing opinions only solidifies Mojtaba's standing as the front-runner for replacing Khamenei. Nominations from politicians connected to the current Shia leadership.

In Qom or Grand Ayatollah Sistani's followers were rejected, making it less probable that other groups would oppose Mojtaba. With this calculated move, Mojtaba's nomination is guaranteed to go unopposed in the assembly. The prior term's dismissal of Hassan Khomeini served as a bid to prevent any reformist endeavors to contest Mojtaba's nomination. The regime's deliberate action demonstrates its commitment to maintaining control over the succession process and consolidating power (Mohammadi, 2024).

This was the first ballot since Mahsa Amini's death in 2022, while he was under the care of Iran's "morality police," sparked widespread protests. International human rights organizations said that the Iranian government violently suppressed the protests and arrested large numbers of people. The elections were held in the midst of severe sanctions against Iran, which prevented many moderates and reformists from participating. Some Iranians, notably the imprisoned Nobel Peace Prize laureate Narges Mohammadi, had advocated for a boycott; it was unclear if this was because of voter indifference or a desire to send a message to Iran's theocracy (Al-Jazeera, 2024).

The pattern of declining voter turnout serves as a clear indication of Iranians' growing disenchantment. It is important to note that this is the third election in four years that the majority of voters have not cast a ballot. Iran has a history of having voter turnout rates above 60%. The decrease is more than just a number; it signifies the Islamic Republic's escalating crisis of legitimacy. In a society as vibrant and politically conscious as Iran's, a crisis of this kind is especially noteworthy. Protesters and opposition groups benefit from low voting turnout because they may interpret it as proof that there is a quiet majority against the existing government (Naeni & Nejad, 2024).

4.8.2 Social Causes

The hijab laws, the strict laws especially and the repression from the ruling conservative government make political environment tensed. Majority of Iranians who didn't cast their vote have believe there will be no social change after the elections. This feeling develops the environment of dissatisfaction. That's why people are losing their interest in political affairs because they firmly believed that the dominance and the influence of conservative party will stay same, even after elections. The liberal reformist and economic reformist parties and political

groups have no support of ruling government party as well as supreme leader, their policies and planes are against of the ideology of Islamic Revolution, according to point of view of conservatives. They feel liberals a open challenging threat for the successful regime of revolution in Iran. For preserving the revolutionary ideologies and policies, the government of Iran always suppresses the other parties that stand against of the conservatives. Several ways of repressions including, killings, imprisonment, assignation etc.

Many people have a point of view that now, the conservative party is ruling and after the election also the conservative party will rule. It means there will be no change in after election. So, there is no need to cast their vote by standing in queue and choose a person according to their choice. There believed there will be no change in social policies and domestic policies.

4.8.3 Economic Causes

The opposition critics claim that the mullahs in authority are incapable of resolving the country's economic crisis, which is the result of a confluence of corrupt practices, poor management, and U.S. sanctions reinstated after Washington pulled out of Tehran's nuclear agreement with major nations in 2018 (Hafezi, 2024). The progressively conservative stance taken by the system in the run-up to the elections significantly reduced the likelihood of high turnout, which was almost guaranteed to be low considering the scars from the violent put-down protests in 2022 and the ongoing poor state of the economy (International-crisis- group, 2024).

For Iranians, the vote may have serious economic repercussions. There is a discernible trend in which the administration works to keep prices stable in the run-up to elections in an effort to win over voters. But after yet another election with historically low turnout, the government might be less inclined politically to address economic grievances—possibly even as a punitive measure against a populace that has demonstrated defiance, whose further impoverishment the regime might tolerate in the hopes of preventing political activism. However, this strategy can worsen the existing dismal financial circumstances, which are characterized by high unemployment and escalating popular unhappiness (Naeni & Nejad, 2024).

4.8.4 Human Rights

The arrest of journalists, artists, and other activists, freedom of speech is still a serious problem in the nation (Ibrahim, 2020). Iran ruling class suppress the other parties and wings especially liberals to preserve the actual value of Islamic revolution. Although, it is a healthy step by the government of Iran to maintain the policies of Islamic revolution but it is question mark on the human right protection in Iran.

4.8.5 International Aspect

The elections in Iran have a crucial but unclear foreign component. The Iranian people have sent a clear message to the international community, especially Western nations, about the country's changing political landscape through both street protests and their refusal to participate in the polls. The task facing the West is to accurately decipher these signals and adjust its

approach to Iran in light of them. Iranians are inclined towards a democratic transition, but it seems that the West is unsure of how best to intervene or influence the situation. The next elections have the potential to represent a turning point in relations between Iran and Western capitals. This may involve a shift from merely voicing concerns to enacting measures that would better serve the interests of Iranian civil society (Naeni & Nejad, 2024).

4.8 The Current Status of Iran after the Accidental deaths of Government officials

The deaths of Iran's President Ebrahim Raisi and Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian and others in a helicopter crash on Sunday confirmed by Iranian authorities. After a desperate overnight search for the aircraft in the rugged terrain it had fallen in, rescuers finally found the accident site and retrieved the bodies of the eight people who had been on board. Mohammad Mokhber and Ali Bagheri Kani are now interim president and foreign minister, respectively, and may be replaced once a new president is elected. But both are highly likely to remain at the top levels of government, if not in their new positions, after having been mainstays of the Raisi administration, which was often praised by – and is closely aligned with – Khamenei (Al-jazeera, 2024).

4.9 Impact on electoral process

If a president dies in office, article 131 of the Islamic Republic's constitution says that the first vice president - who is Mohammad Mokhber - takes over, with the confirmation of the supreme leader, who has the final say in all matters of state in Iran. A council consisting of the first vice president, the speaker of parliament and the head of the judiciary must arrange an election for a new president within a maximum period of 50 days. Raisi was elected president in 2021 and, under the usual timetable, a presidential election had been due to take place in 2025. Under constitutional rules, it can now be expected to take place by early July. (Reuters, 2024).

Iran will now have to hold elections and choose a new president within 50 days, according to the country's constitution, about a year sooner than planned. State media has reported that the election will take place on June 28, with candidates to be registered between May 30 and June 3 (Al-jazeera, 2024).

4.10 Results and Discussion

- President and other official deaths created a leadership gap in Iran. The president is the second power in Iran. The accidental death of president arising new questions as well as the aggression in Iranian public for West will be increased.
- Following this, the wave of neo-conservative faction will gain momentum.
- The liberal faction in Iran will lose its strength.
- The political control will be in hands of neo-conservatives once again.



- The new president will be from the conservative faction or from the neo-conservative faction.
- The revolutionary regime for next four years will be in safe hands.

5. Conclusion

After examining the outcomes of Iranian elections, it is possible to draw the following conclusions: first, until the second round of elections, which is scheduled for April, there will be confusion about the flow of power in the Parliament. Secondly, it can't anticipate reformists and moderates, who generally support ideas such as an open-door policy and expanding conversation with Western nations, to completely remake Iranian society in spite of the reality that they have somewhat reestablished their authority in the Majlis. Actually, every pro-reformist nominee that the Guardian Council has accepted expressed their commitment to the principles of the Islamic Revolution. Several significant changes have been highlighted by the current elections. Initially participation in elections is at its smallest level since the Islamic Republic's founding as a result of the boycott movement. The second is poor voter turnout, which can be seen as a silent objection by those who prefer not to participate in public protests and instead choose to voice their disapproval by not casting a ballot. It is important to remember, nevertheless, that the Parliament frequently acts under the direction of Iran's true sources of influence, meaning that its impact over the country's main political choices is somewhat restricted. Therefore, it is incorrect to read the latest election results as bringing in an entirely fresh split in politics in Iran that pits extreme hardliners (also known as extremists) against centrist hardliners (also known as fundamentalists) but the martyrdom of president and other officials give leadership gap, disturbance in foreign affairs and wars across the borders.

5.2 Recommendation

- Iran should focus on the electoral system to make its modern. The use of electronic method should be increased in country. To fulfill the modern electoral measure, it is necessary to use modern technologies like e-voting. Iranian's government mainly focus on the defense forces such as Quds force, IRGC, Basij, morality police etc and also on foreign policies. The show low interest to update their electoral system. Iran's government should pay attention to modernize their electoral system to create their name in technological electoral countries in world.
- Official authorities should listen the silent majority of public. Their demands should be the concern of the government.
- For preserving the revolutionary regime, the pure dominance of conservatives faction is not the solution of the problem. For securing the revolutionary policies and preserver country from political collapse, the license of liberal and leftist political parties should be revoked completely.

5.3 Limitations of Study

The study deal with the electoral and political process of Iran. The results of parliamentary elections as well as the assembly of experts also covered. The martyrdom of president of Iran is the biggest challenge for Iran, now. The challenges, the changes in election schedule after the death of president during office is also the part of this study. This research is not deal with the foreign policies under Ibraim Raisi and the role of foreign minister is also not the part of it. Purely, it is the study of Iranian election process, its phases and analysis of results. The recent accidental death of president's impacts on electoral process also checked.

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